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INTRODUCTION

"But such mistakes are not new; history is full of the errors
of states and princes. . . .Those who govern, having much
business on their hands, do not generally like to take the trouble
of considering and carrying into execution new projects."'

The Department of Energy [hereinafter DOE] runs the Government's multi-billion dollar uranium enrichment business, and
is accordingly responsible for the reliable supply of nuclear fuel
to the vast majority of nuclear utilities in the United States as
well as to many nuclear utilities in other countries. Important
questions have arisen concerning DOE's compliance with key
provisions of law relating to its enrichment business. According
to DOE, the continued existence of the agency as a reliable and
competitive supplier of enrichment services may hinge on the
answers to these questions. The basic energy independence of
the United States in the nuclear electrical power area may therefore also be implicated.
I.

THE PROBLEM

Nuclear fuel used in most nuclear power reactors is comprised of two basic inputs: natural uranium and enrichment
services.2 Enrichment services, commonly sold in units of "sep*Member, D.C. Bar. The author has advised clients, particularly in the uranium
supply industry, concerning the requirements of section 161v. of the Atomic Energy
Act. The author appreciates assistance received from B. Jeanine Hull, the staff of the
General Accounting Office and the staff of the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs in pointing out some of the information referenced in, and in reviewing some
of the drafts of, this paper. The author also wishes to thank the numerous officials of
the Department of Energy whose statements stimulated his interest in this subject. The
reader may be assured, however, that the views expressed herein are solely the author's
own. Finally, the author thanks Anne Carson and Martha Foster for dredging up some
of the materials on which this paper relies.
B. FRANKLIN, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 161 (M. Farrand ed. 1949).
The uranium fuel cycle consists of six essential fuel processing steps. First,
uranium ore is mined from its deposits in nature. Second, the ore is put through a
milling process in which it is concentrated in a commercial product referred to as
"yellowcake," usually in the form of uranium oxide or UO,. Third, the yellowcake is
converted to a gas, uranium hexafloride, or UF,. Fourth, the uranium hexafluoride is
enriched at a uranium enrichment plant. Fifth, the enriched uranium hexafluoride is
converted to ceramic uranium dioxide pellets and encased in long, slender sealed rods
which are arranged in fuel assemblies. On average, a typical I gigawatt reactor will
refuel every 18 months. During each refueling, one-third of the reactor's fuel supply is
replaced. A complete core contains roughly 585 kilograms of nuclear fuel. Sixth, and
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arative work" or "SWU's," are necessary to increase the concentration of the fissionable isotope U-235 in a given quantity
of uranium from the ratio of approximately 0.701o (which occurs
in nature) to the range of 2016 to 406 .3The federal government,
through the Atomic Energy Commission [hereinafter AEC] and
its successors, the Energy Research and Development Administration [hereinafter ERDA]4 and DOE,5 has always been the sole
domestic supplier of uranium enrichment services and, until
recently, was the sole supplier to the Free World. So long as the
United States Government enjoyed a monopoly position, it could
freely establish prices and conditions for the sale of enrichment

services.
Perhaps erosion of the federal monopoly by foreign interests
was inevitable, but the United States unquestionably pursued
policies hastening that erosion. One factor accelerating the end
of the monopoly was loss of control over the costs of the federal
finally, when the enriched fuel has been depleted, the spent fuel assemblies must be
removed from the reactor core and stored indefinitely. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, U.S.
URANIUM ENRICHMENT: OPTIONS FOR A COMPETITIVE PROGRAM 3 (1985) [hereinafter CBO];
Proceedings of the Tri-Committee Business Advisory Panel on Uranium Enrichment,
Hearings Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
18 (1984) [hereinafter Business Panel) (statement of John R. Longenecker, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Uranium Enrichment, Department of Energy). Most commercial
utilities currently store their spent fuel under water in temporary facilities. The federal
government has taken responsibility for providing for permanent disposal of all commercially generated spent fuel. This federal program will be financed from funds derived
from a I m/kwh fee on nuclear-generated electricity. See Nuclear Waste Policy Act,
42 U.S.C. § 10101 (1983).
1 Natural uranium consists approximately 99.3% of the isotope U-238, which is
not readily fissionable, and 0.7% of the isotope U-235, which is. Of these two isotopes,
only U-235 can sustain a nuclear chain reaction and thus serve as a source of energy in
a typical nuclear reactor.
Specially designed breeder reactors, none of which are currently in (or planned for)
commercial operation in the United States, convert non-fissionable U-238 to fissionable
plutonium-239 (or, alternatively, convert non-fissionable thorium-232 to fissionable U233) and burn the "bred" fuel. Such systems are not so dependent upon enrichment
services as are reactors designed for the customary uranium fuel cycle. The Canadian
government has developed and currently markets a reactor system (the "Candu" system)
which employs natural uranium and deuterium and does not require enrichment.
'The Atomic Energy Commission was established by the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,
60 Stat. 755 (1946), and was re-constituted under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 24
U.S.C. § 2011 (1973) [hereinafter AEA]. The Atomic Energy Commission was abolished
by the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1233 (1974),
and AEC's uranium enrichment activities were transferred to the newly formed Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 5812 & 5814(c) (1983).
1 ERDA was abolished and its functions transferred to the DOE by the DOE
Organization Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(a) (1977).
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program. Forecasting an expanding market, 6 the AEC (and its

successors) in the 1970's invested billions of dollars in augmenting existing enrichment facilities7 and in developing new enrichment technologies.' Recovering the costs of these investments
required increased prices for enrichment. Additionally federal
authorities signed enormous long-term "take-or-pay" electrical

supply contracts with Tennessee Valley Authority [hereinafter
TVA], requiring the federal enrichment program to pay TVA in
excess of one billion dollars for electricity even if not used
because of slower than expected growth in demand. Again the
ground was laid for inflated costs. Other harbingers of the
monopoly's end included government policies creating an artificial demand for enrichment. The AEC in 1974 required its
customers to contract for enrichment well in advance of need, 9
thus creating a situation in which a nuclear fuel glut would arise
if planned nuclear expansion faltered. Another unfortunate development was direct federal encouragement of foreign competition. For example, in 1974, the federal government "closed its
order books" forcing foreign governments to develop competing

During the 1970's, the Atomic Energy Commission and its successors, ERDA
and DOE, forecast skyrocketing demand for nuclear generated electricity. See, e.g.,
AEC, THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY I (1973); Uranium Enrichment: Heading for the Abyss,
221 SCIENCE 730, 731 (1983). Relying on these projections, Congress expected that some
1,000 commercial reactors would require licensing by the turn of the century in the
United States alone. See S. REP. No. 93-980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. at 19 & 77 (1974).
7 The chief augmentations were the $1.5 billion "cascade improvement"
and
"cascade upgrading" programs (CIP/CUP). See Business Panel, supra note 2, at 74.
' In 1976, Congress authorized the construction of additional uranium enrichment
capacity at the Portsmouth (Ohio) Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site. In 1977, President
Carter announced that gas centrifuge technology would be used for the new plant.
Roughly $2.8 billion has been spent on the gas centrifuge through FY 1985. In addition,
$0.8 billion in interest has been imputed. See Statement of J. Dexter Peach (GAO)
before the Energy Cons. and Power Subcomm., House Comm. in Energy and Commerce,
for release on Dec. i, 1985 at 2.
Advocates of the gas centrifuge estimated that an additional $4.2 billion in FY
1986 dollars would be required to bring a full-scale plant on line. See Post-Hearing
Questions and Answers (Witness John Longenecker) Relating to the March 21, 1985
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment of the House Interior
and Insular Affairs Comm., Q7 and Ql1(a), reprinted in Uranium Enrichment and Supply:
HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 391-94 (1985).
AEC, for example, adopted the so-called long term fixed commitment contract
(LTFC) for enrichment purposes. See generally Proposed Changes in AEC Contract
Arrangements for Uranium Enriching Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings].
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enrichment facilities.' 0
Unfortunately, AEC's demand forcecasts were drastically in
error." Instead of accelerating, United States reactor orders
drastically declined and disappeared after 1978. Order cancellations and schedule delays were epidemic. To make matters worse,
nuclear programs slowed in other countries.
DOE is now faced with low priced competition, both from
foreign enrichers 2 and from the so-called "secondary market"
I" See Radical Surgery in Uranium Enrichment, 228 SCIENCE 1407 (1985); Uranium
Enrichment Policy: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Energy Research and Development, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 Hearings]; F. Bujon, Welcome
to the Business World-A Competitor's 'Unbiased' View of DOE's Enrichment Enterprise,
Speech by President of Cogema at Atomic Industrial Forum Fuel Cycle Conference 3 (1986).
" DOE admits that its forecasts were "unrealistic." Business Panel, supra note 2,
at 18. DOE in fact was mistaken by a factor of about 10. See DOE Revises Its Uranium
Enrichment Program, PuB. UTm.. FORT., March 15, 1984, 47. The following chart drawn
from DOE material published in Business Panel, supra note 2, at 17, illustrates the
scope of the problem.

U.S. Supplied Civilian
Separative Work Demand Projections
IS0 FO

1974 Forecast Assumed

Yr. of Forecast
1974

Pu Recycle; Thereafter
Does Not
*0.20% U-1235 Tails Assay
1978
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0

09
1973
0

1980
1982
1983

2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
DOE currently has three competitors, all government-owned. The first is Eurodif,
over 50% owned by France, and the remainder by Spain, Italy, Belgium, and Iran.
CBO estimates Eurodif's cost is approximately $15/SWU. CBO, supra note 2, at 23.
The second is Urenco, owned by West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands. CBO estimates its cost per SWU is approximately $90. Id. The third is Techsnabex-
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(i.e., sales of surplus inventories in private hands). The agency
is also confronted with expensive overcapacity, 3 heavy payments
to TVA for unused electricity,' 4 and (although this now may be
changing) an unfavorable foreign exchange rate.'5 The net result
is sobering. DOE's costs are higher than the prices available on
the secondary market or from Europe. The agency fears loss of
business, and argues that such a loss may further increase its
costs on a per unit of sales basis, causing yet further erosion of
its market position.
Ordinarily, a business entity would respond by cutting costs,
writing-off investments or taking a loss provided variable costs
of production could be recovered. For the last two years, DOE
officials have been trying to do exactly this. 6 In addition to
cutting costs, the agency has decided to take a $4 billion loss,
or "write-off." Indeed, in the proposed Fiscal Year 1987 Budget,
DOE, through the Administration, formally announced its intent
to write-off some $4 billion of the government's $7.5 billion
enrichment investments. 17 This write-off is a centerpiece of the
rulemaking initiated by the agency on January 19, 1986,1g which

port, owned by the Soviet Union, whose costs are unknown but which reportedly prices
to undercut DOE. Id. at 19.
11Current enrichment capacity available to the Free World equals 41.5 million of
SWU for 1985. Actual Free World demand is approximately 22 million SWU for 1985.
Id. at XII and 15. About three-quarters of the excess capacity is enjoyed by the U.S.
Government.
" See Letter from J. Peach (GAO) to Senator Humphrey (July 15, 1983) (encl.
1).DOE estimates that it will pay a total of approximately $1.2 billion to TVA for

unused electricity. See also J. SIMPSON, FINAL REPORT [FOR DOE]: URANIUM ENRICHMENT
ENTERPRISE OPTIONs STUDY 6 (Nov. 30, 1983) ($1.3 billion in penalty charges); Radical
Surgery, supra note 10, at 1407.
"
Business Panel, supra note 2, at 12, 13.
Among other things, DOE on January 18, 1984 announced the new "utility services" enrichment contract. Under this new contract, DOE pledged to reduce enrichment prices to a level no greater than $135/SWU. The contract also contained features
allowing DOE customers to reduce their contractual obligations to purchase enrichment
to a level more related to actual demand given schedule delays and reactor cancellations.
DOE also abandoned the gas centrifuge facility, thus saving four billion dollars or more
in projected completion costs. Although the Administration has proposed to cancel AVLIS
the agency is attempting to proceed with that economically more attractive ALVIS enrichment technology. DOE has announced that it was placing its Oak Ridge gaseous diffusion
enrichment plant on standy-by and has endeavored to negotiate reductions in the billion
dollar plus "demand chages" which it is obligated to pay TVA for electricity for which
it contracted on a long term basis but is not using.
" OMB, MAJOR POLICY INITIATIVES

88 (1986).

51 Fed. Reg. 3624 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 762).
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concluded with issuance of new regulations on July 29, 1986.19
The prices which DOE currently charges its customers under its

January 1984 Utility Services Enrichment Contract [hereinafter
USEC] are predicated on such a write-off.
But DOE is not an ordinary business as it is owned by the
taxpayers. The losses it sustains are not paid by shareholders
who voluntarily assume such risks, but are assumed by all United
States citizens. Under these circumstances, DOE "losses" arguably amount to subsidies to foreign and domestic utilities doing
business with DOE or, alternatively, to the DOE contractors
who built the excess capacity now beleaguering the agency. From
a political point of view, one may well ask why taxpayers should
subsidize nuclear utilities (by underwriting below cost enrichment), DOE contractors (by paying for unnecessary facilities),
or both.20
DOE also differs from an ordinary business in that it is
subject to special statutory constraints. In particular, the Atomic
Energy Act specifies a number of restrictions upon the manner
in which DOE must conduct its enrichment business. The major
restrictions are set forth in Section 161v. of the Atomic Energy
Act [hereinafter AEA]. 21 The chief substantive requirement is
that "any prices" for enrichment services "shall be [established]
on a basis of recovery of the government's costs over a reasonable period of time."' 22 The chief procedural requirement is that
DOE's enrichment contracts conform to written "criteria"
adopted only after review by the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, and, after disbandment of the Joint Committee in 1977,23
by its successor-the Senate Energy and Natural Resources
Committee and the House Committees on Energy and Commerce
and on Interior and Insular Affairs.
The General Accounting Office [hereinafter GAO] argues
that the federal government is now in violation of both the
substantive and procedural requirements of Section 161v. of the

51 Fed. Reg. 27133 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 762).
See U.S. Uranium Enrichment Program Said Mismanaged, Wash. Post, Mar.
I1,1986, at DI, col. 4; see also Civiak (Cong. Res. Serv.), Cost Accounting, Pricing,
and Cost Recovery in DOE's Uranium Enrichment Program 16 (1985) (discusses OMB
staff position that DOE should not "write-off" enrichment investment).
, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982).
22 Id.
2' 42 U.S.C. § 2258 (1977).
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AEA. In particular, the GAO repeatedly has indicated that
DOE's "write-off" of some four billion dollars in enrichment
capital investment is contrary to law.24 GAO also contends that
DOE's new enrichment contract when issued violated the Section
161v. "criteria" requirement." Consonant with GOA's views, a
federal district court has recently declared invalid DOE's new
has signed
uranium enrichment contract, under which the agency
26
business.
of
worth
dollars
billion
some twenty
In addition, serious doubts exist relating to DOE's compliance with rulemaking requirements applicable to the new enrichment contract under the Administrative Procedure Act
[hereinafter APA] as modified by the DOE Organization Act.
In particular, under Section 501(b)(3) of the DOE Organization
Act,2 7 DOE appears to be barred from either issuing a new
generic enrichment contract or taking other generally applicable
actions relating to its enrichment program without first complying with notice and comment rulemaking requirements under the
APA and certain additional procedures specified in the DOE
Act. DOE failed to comply with any of these requirements or
28
procedures.
Although the agency denies the existence of a problem, its
1986 rulemaking is clearly intended to retroactively approve the
new enrichment contract. In- fact, retroactive approval of the
contract is the express purpose of one of the provisions DOE
purported to adopt on July 29. Congressional response to the
situation has been largely negative. Language disapproving DOE's
new criteria was appended to the Senate version of a debt ceiling
bill. 29 The House of Representatives considered a proposed joint
-1See, e.g., Letter from Comptroller General to the Honorable John D. Dingell
(Dec. 27, 1984) [hereinafter GAO Letter]; Letter from J. Dexter Peach (GAO) to the
Honorable John D. Dingell and Richard L. Ottinger (August 10, 1984); Statement of J.
Dexter Peach before the Energy Cons. & Power Subcomm., House Comm. on Energy
& Commerce (for release Dec. I1, 1985); GAO, Financial Audit, DOE Uranium Enrichment Activity Financial Statements: Sept. 30, 1984, at I (May 1986); Statement of Keith
Fultz (GAO) before the Energy and Env. Subcomm., House Comm. on Interior and
Insular Affairs (August 14, 1986).
21 See, e.g., GAO Letter, supra note 24.
1,Western Nuclear, Inc. v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315 (D. Colo. Sept. 18, 1985),
appeal pending, No. 85-2428 (10th Cir.).
" 42 U.S.C. § 7181(b)(3) (1977).
" See, e.g., GAO Letter, supra note 24.
- See 132 CONG. REC. S10131 (daily ed. August 1, 1986) (debt ceiling legislation);
id. at S 11089 (daily ed. August 9, 1986) (Senate adopts debt ceiling legislation).
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resolution (No. 699) disavowing the criteria. 0 At hearings on
the latter,, all non-government witnesses supported disapproval
of the new contract criteria: the nuclear utility industry disapproved because it believed the criteria charged it with unwarranted costs;3 the National Taxpayers' Union objected because
it believed that the criteria failed to charge utilities enough;"2
and the domestic uranium industry withheld endorsement because it believed that numerous features in the criteria are detrimentally impacting its viability.33 The two House Committees,
to which the joint resolution was referred, voted to report it
favorably. 4 However, in the waning hours of the 99th Congress,
this action was not linked to the Senate's separate effort in the
debt ceiling area. The Appropriations Committees adopted language in the continuing resolution withdrawing funds for certain
aspects of the new criteria." Although DOE has urged that these
events be deemed to suggest a general congressional intent to approve its actions, the situation seems far too complex to infer
congressional ratification.
"This is the most confusing mess I've ever seen," observed
one fuel broker. 7 Certainly the market and the situation are
confused, and that confusion is multi-layered. There is confusion
as to what is going on and why; confusion as to how the law
applies to whatever the facts turn out to be; and confusion as
to whether to change the law if it is applied in a fashion so as
to obstruct what DOE is, or is not, currently doing. In short,
there is confusion as to fact, law and policy.
The need to reach an understanding is great. DOE argues
that if it sets prices at a level sufficient to recover the amounts
calculated by GAO, the enrichment program would be non-

30

H.R. J. Res. 699, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REc. H5697 (daily ed. August

1986).
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Environment of the House Comm.
on Interior & Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (statement of Loring Mills,
Edison Electric Institute at 1-7).
Id. (statement of B. Jeanine Hall, National Taxpayers Union).
Id. (statement of Edward R. Farley, Uranium Producers of America).
See 123 CONG. REc. H8619 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986), announcing H. Rept. 99926, pt. 1.
See 123 CONG. REC. H10844-45 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (conf. report).
"
See 123 CoNo. REc. H10906 (daily ed. Oct. 15 1986) (statement by Mr. Conte);
123 CoNG. REC. S16636 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (Domenici/Helms colloquy).
1 Doubts Pervade Nuclear Fuel Industry, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1985, at 6, col. I.
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competitive." If this is true, the agency would lose customers,
thus sustaining further losses, and the United States could become dependent on foreign sources for enriched nuclear fuel.
. "The root of the enrichment program's crisis," states Science
magazine, "is a series of decisions made a decade ago that
[seemed] logical at the time but with hindsight proved disastrous." 3 9 The initial step in understanding this "mess" is to
explore the history of how and why DOE got where it is today.

II. THE RISE AND FALL OF DOE's ENRICHMENT MONOPOLY
The Federal Monopoly on Nuclear Fuel

A.

The nuclear industry effectively came into being with the
Manhattan Project, conducted under the auspices of the United
States Army's Manhattan Engineer District [hereinafter MED]
during World War II. A total of nearly 150,000 workers engaged in different aspects of the enterprise. Exempt from
congressional management, MED's cost totaled an estimated $2
billion . 4 Among other things, MED sought out sources of uranium and constructed the first significant uranium enrichment
facility - the gaseous diffusion plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee
to enrich uranium for military purposes.4 2 There were no
other enrichment facilities at that time. The federal government
thus enjoyed an absolute monopoly with respect to uranium
enrichment and nuclear fuel.
The federal monopoly was carried forward by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946."' This new statute established the Atomic
See, e.g., Statement of John R. Longenecker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Uranium Enrichment, before the Energy and Env. Subcomm. of the Interior and Insular
Affairs Comm., Oct. 22, 1985, at p.4:
[t]he key to success of the U.S. uranium enrichment enterprise is to get
near-term prices down to the competitive range through the timely introduction of advanced technology. The market is extremely price sensitive
and thus a crucial part of our competitive strategy is our approach to
pricing. Our prices simply must be more competitive.
3" Radical Surgery, supra note 10, at 1407; A Competitor's View, supra note 10, at 1.
I See, e.g., B. GOLDSCHMIDT, THE ATOMIC COMPLEX: A WORLDWIDE POLITICAL
HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY
NEW WORLD:

A

(Amer. ed. 1982); 1 R.

HEWLETr &

0.

ANDERSON, THE

HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

1939-1946

(1972).
" B. GOLDSCHmIDT, supra note 40, at 54. This is roughly 10 billion in current dollars.
2 Id. at 55.
4' 60 Stat. 755.
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Energy Commission (AEC) which was encharged with all func-

tions of the MED" as well as oversight of both civilian and military
uses of atomic energy. Although Congress predicted a potentially
important future for civilian uses of nuclear energy, the 1946 Act
provided for tight federal control of nuclear fuel. In particular,
the 1946 Act prohibited private ownership of enriched uranium,45
termed "fissionable material." ' 6 Private parties seeking to employ
enriched material for peaceful purposes, such as for generation
of electrical power, were required to lease it from the AEC. As
a result, the Commission was the sole purchaser of uranium from
the mining industry." The regime was carried forward with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954."'
B.

The Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials Act

The AEC was concerned with the budget implications of
continued government ownership of all enriched nuclear fuels.
The agency feared that government ownership would lead to an
increasingly onerous federal investment in the fuel used by domestic and foreign utilities. Driven by this and other factors, 9
in March, 1963, the AEC proposed legislation to eliminate the
statutory requirement for mandatory government ownership of
all "special nuclear material" (the term employed in the 1954
Act for enriched uranium) and to permit private ownership
instead.5 0 The proposed legislation envisioned the Commission
See R. HEWLETT & 0. ANDERSON, supra note 40, at 620.
See Section 5(a)(2) of the AEA of 1946, supra note 4.
See Section 5(a)(l) of the AEA of 1946, supra note 4.
7 See generally AEC, Statement on Uranium Supply Policies and Related Activities
(1968), reprinted in Status of the Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry: The
Effects of Imports: Hearing Before the Energy Res. and Dev. Subcomm. of the Senate
Energy and Nat. Res. Comm., 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 405 (19081) thereinafter 1981 Hearingsl.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1954). Section 52 of the AEA of 1954, 68 Stat. 929-30,
prohibited private ownership of "special nuclear material."
4 For example, AEC also felt that private ownership would provide greater assurance to domestic and foreign utilities and thus encourage the development of atomic
energy. See Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Jr. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 4
(1963) (hereinafter 1963 Hearings].
.4 Letter from Leland J. Haworth (AEC) to Lyndon B. Johnson (Pres. of the
Senate) (March 15, 1963), reprintedin 1963 Hearings, supra note 49, at 187 and Private
Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials, 1964: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Legislation of the Jt. Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 343 (1964)
Ihereinafter 1964 Hearings).
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entering into agreements for the enrichment of uranium, termed
toll enrichment, but contained a number of limitations on this
projected new authority. The most significant economic constraint rendered the requirements of Section 161m. of the AEA
applicable to the AEC's sales of full enrichment. Section 161m.
provided (and still provides) that prices for Commission materials and services "shall be established on such a nondiscriminatory basis as, in the opinion of the Commission, will provide
reasonable compensation to the Government for such material
or services and will not discourage the development of sources
of supply independent of the Commission." 5 The Commission's
bill also required the AEC to establish "criteria" for pricing
special nuclear5 2material, and further required those prices to be
"reasonable.1
However, this provision did not apply to toll
enrichment.
The initial hearing in 1963 "identified a number of important
policy questions." 53 The key question for our purposes was an
issue which spawned a major portion of Section 161v., which
on its face would seem to have little to do with the basis for
providing toll enrichment services. That question was: "Shall
some restrictions be imposed on the importation of foreign
uranium concentrates for enrichment and sale on the domestic
54
market?"
At the time Congress was considering private ownership of
enriched nuclear fuel, the AEC was the only significant buyer
of uranium in the Free World. The Commission had accumulated a stockpile of uranium ore which was (and apparently still
is) more than adequate to meet U.S. military requirements.55
1, 1964

Hearings, supra note 50, at 351-52.
12 Id. at 355.
IId. at 1.
5 Id.
During and immediately after WW II, the United States was dependent largely
on a Canadian radium mine in the Arctic Circle and on the Shinkolobwe mine in what
was then the Belgian Congo (now Zaire) for its uranium supplies. Authorities labored
under the assumption that commercial deposits of uranium were not plentiful. One of
the AEC's initial actions was to embark on a program to develop supplies of uranium
in the United States and overseas, particularly Canada and South Africa. The Commission in essence created the Canadian and South African uranium industries, procuring
in excess of 100,000,000 pounds of uranium from these two countries by the early 1960s.
See T. NEFF, THE INTERNATIONAL URANIUM MARKET 145 (Canada) & at 174-75 (South
Africa) (1984); YOKELL & DE SALvo, The Uranium Default: Westinghouse and the
Utilities, PUB. UrL. FORT., Feb. 7, 1985 at 20, 23.
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The AEC was interested in bringing its costly uranium procurement effort to a close, but without loss of the domestic uranium
industry, which was viewed as important both for defense purposes and as an assured source of supply for the budding civilian
nuclear power industry. Domestic uranium producers were concerned about possible unfair foreign trade practices, such as
dumping foreign uranium on the U.S. market at prices with
which domestic producers could not compete. 6 Some domestic
producers also professed concern regarding possible insufficient
demand from nuclear utilities to sustain a viable domestic uranium industry against low-cost foreign producers regardless of
unfair trade practices." With the exception of domestic producers holding foreign uranium reserves, 8 the domestic uranium
industry and its supporters in the powerful Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy called for an exclusion of foreign-source uranium
from the domestic market1 9 They argued that dependence on
foreign supplies "would be contrary to the essential security
interests of the United States." 60
Responding to this concern, the Commission offered to bar
enrichment of foreign uranium intended for domestic end-use
until 1975, evidently as a function of the agency's general authority to regulate the nuclear industry to assure the common
defense and security6' and to maximize national welfare. 62 The
1975 sunset was chosen because the Commission projected that
the domestic demand for uranium would then be large enough
Offering price guarantees, free technology, and other inducements, the Commission's domestic program was so successful that uranium discoveries by the mid-1950's
were sufficient to meet all U.S. military needs independent of the foreign supplies which
had been procured. See generally AEC, Statement on Uranium Supply Policies and
Related Activities, supra note 47.
" See 1963 Hearings, supra note 49, at 114-15.
" See, e.g., 1964 Hearings, supra note 50, at 154 (testimony of Dean McGee
alluding to low-cost Canadian reserves and South African production as a by-product
of gold mining).
Id. at 206 (testimony of the President of Western Nuclear, Inc.).
See, e.g., 1963 Hearings, supra note 49, at 115 (discussion of whether to prohibit
enrichment of foreign source uranium for domestic end-use).
1*See, e.g., 1964 Hearings, supra note 50, at 154 (testimony by the President
of Kerr-McGee Oil Industries). The AEC agreed that "it [is] essential that [the domestic
Id. at 4. See also id. at 427 (remarks of
uranium) industry be maintained viable ...
Congressman Hosmer).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1973).
Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2013(c) (1973) wiih 42 U.S.C. § 2201(p) (1973) (authority
to issue rules to carry out any purpose of the chapter).
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to sustain a viable domestic uranium industry in the face of
foreign competition . 61 Uranium producers, however, speaking
through Dean McGee, the Chairman of the Kerr-McGee Corporation, called for specific legislation to "postpon[e] the enrichment in Government plants of foreign uranium for domestic
use. "' Representative Holifield, the Vice-Chairman of the Joint
Committee, accordingly invited Mr. McGee to suggest an appropriate amendment. 6 McGee proposed several amendments. The
most significant was to "empower" the Commission to "protect
against ... toll enrichment in Government facilities of uranium
of foreign origin for domestic end-use. ' 'M This amendment, cast
in the form of a proviso to Section 161m. of the Atomic Energy
Act, required the AEC to
establish criteria in writing setting forth the terms and conditions of making such production or enrichment services available and in this regard, shall not extend its services to source
or special nuclear materials of foreign origin intended for
domestic use to the extent necessary to assure the development
of a viable domestic uranium mining and milling industry: And
providedfurther, that before the Commission establishes such
criteria, the criteria shall be submitted to the Joint Committee,
and a period of forty-five days shall elapse while Congress is
in session (in computing such forty five days there shall be
excluded the days in which either House is not in session
because of adjournment for more than three days) unless the
Joint Committee by resolution waives the conditions of, or all
or any portion of, such forty-five day period. 7
11In

the words of the Commission:
In the early years, it is the Commission's intent not to toll enrich uranium

of foreign origin, except where the enriched product is to be re-exported
for foreign consumption. This restriction would be removed July 1, 1975,
when civilian requirements are expected to be sufficiently high that the
viability of the domestic industry would no longer be at stake.
1964 Hearing, supra note 50, at 5. Dr. Seaborg subsequently testified that AEC expected
domestic civilian demand to reach about 8,000 tons per year (the level of U.S. government procurement for the latter portion of the 1960's) by 1975. Id. at 16-17.
- Mr. McGee explained that "[allthough we have full confidence in the present
Commission, such a statement of the Commission's present intent is not a sufficient
basis on which the domestic industry can make the long-term commitments required for
an adequate program of exploration and development of new reserves." Id. at 155.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 197.
Id. at 198. There is some question as to why the AEC and uranium producers
advocated protection of the domestic uranium industry through limitations on AEC toll
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When the Joint Committee reported the Private Ownership
of Special Nuclear Material Act, the legislation contained a new
Section 161v. governing toll enrichment services. As reported by
the Joint Committee, Section 161v. specifically authorized the
Commission to enter into contracts to provide, after December
31, 1968, "for the producing or enriching of special nuclear
material in facilities owned by the Commission" for both domestic and foreign customers, subject to the following proviso:
That (i) prices for services [rendered domestic customers] shall
be established on a non-discriminatory basis; (ii) prices for
services [rendered foreign customers] shall be no less than
prices [charged domestic customers]; and (iii) prices shall be
established on a basis which will provide reasonable compensation to the Government: And provided further, that the
Commission, to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance
of a viable domestic uranium industry, shall not offer such
enrichment services. A possible reason for this approach appears to be that, although
foreign uranium producers were uncomfortable with it, it was viewed as arguably consistent with U.S. obligations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
whereas a quota or a tariff might violate GATT, absent invocation of the national security
exception under Article XXI. See S. CoNo. REp. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 1964 U.S. CODE CoNo. & ADinu. Naws 3105, 3121 ("The committee believes that these
reasonable and flexible restrictions on the performance of services by the Commission
should not in any sense be deemed inconsistent with any obligations the United States
may have under . . . (GATT) and other international trade agreements."); see also
Letter from Mr. Yeutter to Mr. Udall (July 15, 1985) (enrichment limitation does not
infringe GATT because it is a condition under which U.S. Government renders a service).
But see Letter from Alexis Johnson (State Dept.) to Glenn Seaborg (AEC) (June 8,
1964) reprinted in 1964 Hearings, supra note 50, at 409-11 (suggesting that enrichment
limitation may violate "either or both" of U.S. trade policies to reduce trade barriers
or GAI ).
The approach suggested by Mr. McGee had a potential weakness from the point of
view of domestic uranium producers. That weakness was that an AEC enrichment
limitation could theoretically be circumvented in at least two ways. First, if the AEC's
enrichment plants were privatized, the limitation would lapse. Second, domestic utilities
might import enriched uranium of foreign origin. Mr. McGee in fact recognized these
problems, 1964 Hearings, supra note 50, at 155-56, and suggested that the legislation
also include language specifically authorizing the Commission to regulate in a fashion
so as to prevent these problems. Id. at 198. These suggestions were not adopted by the
Joint Committee, evidently in part because the AEC took the position that it implicitly
had such authority without the additional language. See 1963 Hearings, supra note 49,
at 29-30 (AEC asserts that it has authority to regulate importation of enriched uranium
so as to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry by imposing
conditions on licenses required to import and to possess such material under the Atomic
Energy Act); Proposed Modification of Restrictions on Enrichment of Foreign Uranium
for Domestic Use: HearingsBefore the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 8, 233 (1974) (hereinafter 1974 Hearings].
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services for source or special nuclear materials of foreign origin
intended for use in a utilization facility within or under the
jurisdiction of the United States. The Commission shall establish criteria in writing setting forth the terms and conditions
under which services provided under this subsection shall be
made available including the extent to which such services will
be made available for source or special nuclear material of
foreign origin intended for use in a [reactor] within or under
the jurisdiction of the United States: Provided, that before the
Commission establishes such criteria, the proposed criteria shall
be submitted to the Joint Committee, and a period of fortyfive days shall elapse which Congress is in session (in computing the forty-five days there shall be excluded the days in
which either House is not in session because of adjournment
for more than three days) unless the Joint Committee by
resolution in writing waives the conditions of, or all or any
portion of, such forty-five day period.6
The new provision carried forward the requirement, which the
AEC proposed for Section 161m. of the AEA, that the price for
toll enrichment be reasonable and non-discriminatory. The new
provision, however, did not contain the restriction in Section
161m. that the price for such services should not discourage the
development of independent sources of supply. This omission
suggested that profit-taking or price gouging was to be avoided
in the enrichment area. The legislative history states that the
charge for toll enrichment is to be "based generally upon the
cost of doing necessary processing .

.

. in the Government's

different plants. 69 The Joint Committee indicated that the "reasonable compensation" standard contained some flexibility, but
described this as flexibility in a particular direction: namely, to
permit the Commission not to charge initially for enrichment
plant capacity constructed for military purposes and not used
for civilian enrichment. In justification of this flexibility, the
Committee noted that there was a "national interest in the
development and utilization of nuclear power."7 0
The new Section 161v. also incorporated without substantial
change the proposals of the uranium producers that: (a) the
government issue written criteria, subject to prior 45-day review
6 42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1973).
6
S. CON. REP. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964).
Id. at 17-18.
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before the Joint Committee, to govern the provision of enrich-

ment services; and (b) federal enrichment of foreign-source uranium for domestic end-use be limited "to the extent necessary
to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry.""
C.

The 1966 Criteriaand Requirements Contracts

The Commission proposed initial criteria in 1966 to implement the Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Material Act
(and particularly Section 161v.)."2 These initial criteria, adopted
largely as proposed, 73 are important for a variety of reasons.
Most significant for purposes here, the criteria set forth the
initial understanding of AEC concerning the statutory requirement that it charge "reasonable compensation" for enrichment
services to the government.' 4 Both the proposed and final criteria
" AEC's initial criteria barred enrichment of foreign source uranium for domestic
end use. 31 Fed. Reg. 16479 (1966). Based on optimistic forecasts of expanding demand
for nuclear power and, consequently, uranium (see AEC, THEa NUCLEAR INDUSTRY I
(1973); Proposed Changes in AEC ContractArrangements for Uranium Enriching Services: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Energy of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy,
93d Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1973) [hereinafter 1973 Hearings]; Uranium Enrichment: Hearing
for the Abyss, 221 SCIENCE 730 (1983); Letter from J. Peach (GAO) to Rep. Ottinger
(26 Jan. 1984)), the AEC in 1974 adopted new criteria phasing out the limitations during
the period 1978-83. As noted, the optimistic projections did not come to pass. The domestic
uranium industry began to appeal for relief in 1981. See 1981 Hearings, supra note 47.
Despite several requests from domestic producers to reimpose enrichment limitations
under section 161v., the Department of Energy (now in charge of implementation of
section 161v) has declined. At first, the principal grounds for refusal was simply the
domestic uranium industry was "viable." However, as of September 26, 1985, DOE
declared that the domestic uranium industry was in fact not viable in calendar year 1984.
See Hearing Before the Energy Cons. & Power Subcomm. of House Energy & Comm.,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (testimony of Edward J. Hanrahan, DOE). DOE nevertheless
has declined to reimplement section 161v. See, e.g., Hanrahan, supra. One of the rationales offered by DOE for its refusal to act is that reimposition of enrichment limitations would be circumvented in that utilities would go abroad for enrichment services.
The federal government now takes the position that it lacks authority under the Atomic
Energy Act to prevent this kind of circumvention through the licensing process. See
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Western Nuclear v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1985) (defendants
argue that NRC, to which licensing authority was transferred under the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, "has no authority to regulate import licenses to preserve the [uranium]
industry's economic health"). But see 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) & (p) (1954).
12 Uranium Enrichment Services Criteria and Related Matters: Hearings Before the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 285 (1966) (proposed criteria,
June 29, 1966) [hereinafter 1966 Hearings[.
" 31 Fed. Reg. 16479 (Dec. 23, 1966); 1966 Hearings, supra note 72, at 520.
42 U.S.C. § 2201 (1973).
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explain that: "The Act requires that [enrichment] charges provide reasonable compensation to the Government. AEC's charge
for enriching services will be established on a basis that will
assure the recovery of appropriate Government costs projected
over a reasonable time.""17 As stated, there is some ambiguity,
in that the sentence speaks in terms of "appropriate" government costs. But the criteria later spell out in detail what costs
are "appropriate:"
Itihe cost of [enrichment] includes electric power and all other
costs, direct and indirect, of operating the gaseous diffusion
plants; appropriate depreciation of said plants; and a factor
to cover applicable costs of process development, AEC administration and other Government support functions, and imputed interest on investment in plant and working capital.
During the early period of growth of nuclear power, there will
be only a small civilian demand on the large AEC diffusion
plants. These plants were originally constructed for national
security purposes, but will be utilized in meeting future civilian
requirements. In this interim period of low plant utilization,
the Commission has determined that the costs to be charged
to [enrichment services] produced for civilian customers will
exclude a portion of the costs attributable to depreciation and
allocable to
interest in plant investment which are 7 properly
6
plant in standby and to excess capacity.
The basis for this approach was clearly identified to the Joint
Committee by Mr. Abbadessa, the AEC's Comptroller. Mr.
Abbadessa explained that the Commission intended a "full-cost
charge to the toll-enrichment program." Mr. Abbadessa stated
that the AEC believed that such a charge was "consistent with
the legislative history." This charge would include direct costs,
overhead, depreciation and interest on the Government's investment. However, it would not include depreciation and imputed
interest on "costs associated with unused capacity in [enrichment] plants which were built essentially for military purposes."
Those costs were to be charged "to national defense. ' 7 7 Noting
1966 Hearings, supra note 72, at 287 (proposed) & 522 (final).

Id. at 287-88 (proposed) & 522 (final). The criteria also indicated that imputed
interest on so-called pre-produced uranium (uranium enriched from the government
stockpile in advance of actual need) "will be factored into the [enrichment services]
charges." Id. at 288 (proposed) & 522 (final).
71 Id. at 31.
"
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that "if the plant were built today it would necessarily have
some excess capacity," Mr. Abbadessa was asked why AEC was
not charging at least some of its costs associated with excess
capacity to enrichment customers. In response, Mr. Abbadessa
explained that the Commission intended to charge depreciation
and imputed interest on the entire enrichment investment once
actual utilization of the plants reached 75%10. Mr. Abbadessa
explained that it was not reasonable to expect private industry
and recover
to build a plant with more than 25% excess capacity
78
all the costs of such capacity from its customers.
Mr. Conway, Executive Director for the Joint Committee,
nevertheless objected to AEC's failure to include some costs for
excess capacity when plant utilization fell below 7500.79 Mr.
Conway's concerns were addressed in an exchange of letters
between the Joint Committee and the AEC. The letters embodied
a careful and precise interpretation of the criteria. Under this
interpretation, a portion of costs attributable to depreciation and
interest on plant investment associated with unused capacity
would continue to be charged to national defense. However, the
AEC would recover depreciation and interest costs on that percentage of plant production capacity used, plus 100%0, but with
a floor of no less than 300o. Once plant use reached 750o, 1000%0
of depreciation and interest costs were recoverable.80 This construction of the criteria and the agreement it embodied with the
Joint Committee became known as the "Conway Formula."
Another feature of the criteria, later to be of some controversy, was the provision for a guaranteed ceiling price of $30
per kilogram unit of "separative work" ("SWU") for separation
of U-235 from U-238. The ceiling price, however, was subject
to upward escalation for the cost of electric power and labor,"'
82
and this was viewed as sufficient to assure full cost recovery
3
over the expected thirty year term of some of the contracts.
The guiding principle of the 1966 criteria was flexibility. The
" Id. at 32.

See, e.g., id. at 62.
,o Letter from Chairman Holifield (Jt. Comm. on Atomic Energy) to Dr. Seaborg
(Chairman, AEC) (Oct. 18, 1966); Letter from Dr. Seaborg to Chairman Holifield (Dec.
16, 1966) (both letters are reprinted in the 1966 Hearings, supra note 72, at 517-19).
This formula is known as Conway Excess Capacity Formula or Conway Formula.
"
1966 Hearings. supra note 72, at 522.
82 Id. at 319 (projected full cost over period 1969-75 would be below $30 ceiling).
Id. at 34 (escalation would provide protection over a 30 year period).
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criteria envisioned two types of AEC contracts, or some combination thereof. The two types were the "firm quantities" and
the "requirements contract." In the firm quantities regime, AEC
would agree to deliver and the customer to take specified amounts
of enrichment services on a specified schedule for the agreed
term of the contract. Under the requirements contract, the AEC
would agree to provide up to a specified amount of enrichment
services for a specified reactor or group of reactors. The customer would then agree not to rely on alternative sources for
these requirements, but the customer would not be obligated to
take any minimum amount of services, even if there were schedule delays, unexpected outages or other unforeseen problems.8"
As expected, 85 most of AEC's customers chose the requirements
contract format, because it allowed maximum flexibility for the
enrichment customer in arranging fuel deliveries.
AEC announced a $26 uranium enrichment services price on
September 19, 1967.86 The GAO, pursuant to the Joint Committee's requirement, reviewed this price and found it consistent
with the 1966 criteria. The Joint Committee specifically asked
whether the charge constituted a subsidy, (GAO indicated that
it did not), assuming utilization of federal enrichment facilities
87
as expected by the AEC.
In November of 1969, President Nixon asked the AEC to
operate its enrichment facilities as a separate organizational entity within the Commission and in a fashion resembling a commercial enterprise. The President hoped that this would facilitate
sale of the facilities to the private sector ,88 The AEC, Commissioner Ramey dissenting, responded to President Nixon's request
11Id. at 4-5, 7-8 (The Commission's proposed contracts, dated July 1, 1966, are
published in the 1966 Hearings at 290-313.).
" The AEC testified that "a variant of [the requirements) form of contract ...
was initially used by AEC as a promotional aid to encourage construction of nuclear
power reactors abroad. While uncertainties as to the operability of power reactors have
largely been resolved, there remain questions as to the technology, capacity factor versus
time, and economic life. Because of these uncertainties, we believe that the reactor
operation contracting on a long term basis will find considerable advantage in a contract
that provides these types of flexibility as to his fuel needs." Id. at 11-12. Had the
Government retained the requirements contract approach, the problems of surplus inventories and competition from the secondary market which had so devastating an effect
in the early and mid-1980's would never have arisen.
Uranium Enrichment Pricing Criteria: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on

Atomic Energy, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 104 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 Hearings].
Id. at 135-36.
I'
Id. at 7.
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with a proposal to base its toll enrichment prices on the needs,
including profit, of a hypothetical private corporation rather
than on a cost recovery standard.89 The Joint Committee solicited a legal opinion from GAO concerning the validity of the
proposed revisions to the 1966 pricing criteria.' GAO concluded
that the proposed criteria change was not consistent with the
intent of Congress.9' The GAO opinion stated that "reasonable
compensation" under Section 161v. meant full cost recovery and
not elicitation of a profit. 92
Congress reacted to AEC's attempt to revise the 1966 pricing
criteria with an amendment to Section 161v. The amendment
changed the statutory basis of pricing under the toll enrichment
program from "reasonable compensation" to the current phrase
"recovery of the Government's costs over a reasonable period
of time." 93 In so doing, the Joint Committee explicitly affirmed
GAO's legal opinion. The Committee stressed that it expected
"this reiteration of congressional intent [to] preclude any further
attempt to deviate from the purpose of the statute." 9 4
D. The Glory Years, the 1973 Criteria and the Fixed
Commitment Contract
The early 1970's were heady days for nuclear power. Fueled
by Project Independence, 9 oil embargoes,96 uncertainties over
use of coal due to environmental concerns, 97 steadily rising demand for electricity 98 and the implicit assumption that nuclear
Id. at 3.
IId. at 160.
' Id. at 176.
The GAO opinion acknowledged some flexibility to disregard certain costs due
to overcapacity resulting from cutbacks in military enrichment requirements to the extent
that inclusion of the cost would cause enrichment prices "to increase so significantly
that the development of atomic power would be impeded." 1970 Hearings, supra note
86, at 172-73. In GAO's view, the only flexibility to full cost recovery requirement was
in terms of the problem addressed by the Conway Formula.
42 U.S.C. § 2051 (1973).
"

H.R. REP. No. 1470, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1970); S.REP. No. 1247, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1970).
FEDERAL

'

ENERGY

ADMINISTRATION,

PROJECT

INDEPENDENCE

REPORT

(1974)

(President Nixon's plan for important reliance on nuclear power).
"
AEC, THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1-2 (1973).
7Id.

Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES, Feb. 11, 1985, at 82, 88 (7 percent annual growth
projected).
9"
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technology was sufficiently developed and stabilized to support
heavy investment commitments,' the AEC projected significant
U.S. reliance on nuclear-generated electricity. AEC testified in
1973 that "U.S. nuclear generating capacity will grow to 1,200,000
megawatts by the year 2000"100 and that nuclear power would
fill sixty percent of U.S. needs.' 0 ' AEC also projected that nugrow to
clear capacity in other Free World nations would
02
century.'
the
of
turn
the
by
megawatts
1,460,000
Such an eighty-fold expansion in nuclear generating capacity
obviously would require an expansion in facilities to enrich
uranium. AEC testified concerning the need for as many as 11
new enrichment plants of a size equal to the average size of the
three existing plants.'0 3 Indeed, the agency foresaw a need for
six new enrichment plants by 1985." ° At an estimated $1.5 billion
per plant, the total enrichment investment over the next ten
years would be roughly $9.0 billion, exclusive of additional
capital costs associated with supplying electricity to the plants.'0 5
To begin to address this projected explosive growth in demand for enrichment capacity, AEC initiated a billion dollar
plus program to increase the capacity at its three existing diffusion plants from roughly 17,000,000 SWU's per year to
27,000,000 SWU's.1'° However, the agency professed reluctance
to assume the burden of constructing new enrichment plants.
"It is our belief," the agency declared, "that U.S. private industry can and should assume responsibility for the additional
plants needed to meet this vast increase in demand for enrichment services and therefore, the Commission does not intend to
build additional enrichment plants." 1"
In order "to assist and encourage the participation by private
industry in the supply of enrichment services," the AEC on
January 18, 1973 proposed a number of revisions to the existing
enrichment criteria, as well as a new form of enrichment contract
Id. at 84 ("The assumption was you had a mature technology when in fact it
was still evolving.").
1973 Hearings, supra note 71, at 7.
Id.
Id2d.
io'ld.

"

Id. at 9.
Id.
1973 Hearings, supra note 71, at 9, 325.
Id. at 9.
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- the "long term Fixed Commitment Contract [hereinafter LTFC
contract]." "' The proposed new criteria and LTFC contract
constituted what became a debilitating blunder on the part of
federal enrichment authorities.
AEC estimated that a lead time of approximately eight years
was required to construct new enrichment plants.'09 Under the
LTFC contract the agency accordingly proposed to require that
0
customers contract eight years in advance of their needs." Customers were also required to make firm commitments to procure
the enrichment needed for a particular size (in electrical megawatts) of reactor."' After the power plant had actually been
purchased, the customers were required to specify in SWU's the
enrichment services required for a rolling 10 year period forward." 2 The Commission proposed to allow customers to delay
their commitments only with respect to reloads in the event of
3'
schedule delays in completing construction of a reactor." AEC
also withdrew its commitment to maintain its prices below a
stated ceiling. The Commission explained that its price would be
cost-based. It argued that electricity and labor costs were no
longer classified so that utilities could review them and thus did
not require the assurance of a ceiling. The Commission noted
that capital costs for new plants were unpredictable and, consequently, it could not state a ceiling price applicable to that
4
area." 1

The Joint Committee criticized the AEC's proposed criteria
revision because the proposals vested excessive discretion in the
Commission and circumvented the Congressional intent requiring
criteria. Senator Jackson, for example, charged that "the revised
criteria omit any reference to the types and significant details of
the contracts under which enrichment services will be provided."' 5 Additionally, Congressman Price stated:
[s]ince the significant features of the new types of contracts
are not described in the criteria there appears to be nothing
" Id. at 267, 293.
"' Id. at 24.
Id. at 17, 23.
Id. at 24.
1973 Hearings, supra note 71, at 25-26.
' Id. at 26.
Id. at 21.
"IId. at 2.
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that would require the Commission to return to the Joint

Committee should it decide to vary the terms and conditions
under which it would provide the uranium enrichment services.
This seems to be a substantial departure from the intent of
6
Section 161v.1"
Chairman Holifield was of a similar view.'7
Although the Joint Committee ultimately accepted AEC's
LTFC approach, it nevertheless forced a number of changes in
the revised criteria. Those revisions cast the LTFC approach as
a requirement in the final criteria, with the effect of significantly
limiting the Commission's discretion."" For example, one of the
changes was a specific statement to the effect that the "primary
contracting vehicle" would be the Fixed Commitment Contract, 1 9 a copy of which had been furnished the Joint Commit-

tee. 120
On September 11, 1973, the AEC published a notice requiring potential customers, who needed first loads of enriched fuel
before July 1, 1978, to contract before December 31, 1973, and
requiring those customers needing first loads between July 1,
1978 and June 30, 1982 to contract before July 30, 1974.121 The
Commission in essence refused to contract with customers who
did not anticipate initial loading before July 1982.22 The Commission subsequently suspended entering into new long term
contracts, claiming that it was "contracted out."'' 23 These actions
were in large part intended to create conditions under which
alternative sources of enrichment would develop. The Joint
Committee held hearings, expressing frustration that no progress
was being made on constructing additional enrichment capacity
and concern that "[tihis Nation cannot afford the catastrophe
' 24
of a nuclear fuel gap.'

"
'"

Id. at 32.
Id. at 33, 34.

Accord, GAO Letter, supra note 24, at Appendix If.
1973 Hearings, supra note 71, at 426.
'I'

/d. at 695.

Id. at 698-99.
1978 Hearings, supra note 10, at 175-76.

"-'See Future Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry: Hearings Before the
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, 173 (1974) [hereinafter
1974 Hearings].
,' Id. at 2.
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E. Fall-out
The combination of the LTFC Contract and the energy
supply hysteria which surrounded it had tragically destabilized
the nuclear fuel industry. Utilities poured into the AEC to line
up enrichment requirements. This behavior on the part of the
utility industry was not irrational, because "[t]he cost of nuclear
fuel compared to the size of investment in [a] reactor is very
small, but that investment can be rendered useless if fuel is not
there on time so reliability of supply is a very important element
to the customers." ' ' AEC's LTFC policies questioned the availability of fuel supplies for planned reactors. Utilities accordingly
responded by lining up fuel supplies for their maximum possible
projected reactor requirements.
By the end of June 1974, when it suspended further contracting, AEC had received requests for enrichment services for
257,000 megawatts of reactors. This amount was in addition to
the agency's existing contracts to supply 107,000 megawatts worth

of reactors under requirements contracts. 26 As AEC Chairman
Ray testified, this explosion in demand "exceeded expectations
and appears to reflect a growth in demand on a schedule that
may exceed the present capability of industry and the utilities
actually to bring nuclear power plants on line in the near term."' 27
AEC's LTFC policy in fact created a massive artificial demand for enrichment services. In combination with several other
factors, this in turn triggered a subsequent explosive growth in
artificial demand for the uranium which the utilities were now
committed to supply the federal government to enrich.' 2 8 The
previously depressed price for uranium soared. Foreign governments, prompted by AEC's contract cut-off, combined to begin
construction of alternative enrichment facilities. 2 9 Frightened by
the impending fuel crisis, and failing in its effort to stimulate
private enrichment facilities, the federal government decided to
Business Panel, supra note 2, at 47.
1978 Hearings, supra note 10, at 28.
'-2 1974 Hearings, supra note 67, at 517.
"I See TAYLOR, How THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CREATED THE URANIUM CRISIS (AND
THE COMING URANIUM BUST) (preliminary draft) (June 1977), reprinted in 1978 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 143;.see also Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, the Uranium Market
and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 119, 139-40 (1977); Comptroller
General, Certain Actions That Can Be Taken To Help Improve This Nation's Uranium
Picture 5 (1976) (EMD-76-1).
11 1978 Hearings, supra note 10, at 3, 12 (ERDA statement).
'-"

'
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construct new enrichment capacity in 1975, and then began work
on a 10 million SWU gas centrifuge facility at Portsmouth. 30 In
order to alleviate the projected pressure on uranium supplies,
heavy investments were made in breeder reactor research, including a demonstration facility, planned for Clinch River, Tennessee, which would rely on plutonium fuel.' 3 '
But the expected steady increase in demand for electricity
and the projected explosive demand for nuclear power did not
materialize. The rapid increases in the price of oil following the
oil embargoes led to a period of stagnation and energy conservation which diminished the demand for electricity.' 32 Reactor
,orders were well below projections, dropping to only two for
domestic use in 1978 and zero afterward.' 3 Schedule delays and
order cancellations became commonplace. The accident at Three
Mile Island in March of 1979 sealed the near-term fate of the
industry. '3 It is not certain whether any reactor ordered after
1974 will ever be operated in the United States.'35
F.

Mopping Up

The denouement began relatively quickly but has only reached
its current fevered pitch in the last several years. Virtually before
the ink was dry on the new LTFC contracts, customers began
to petition for "relief" in the form of cost-free adjustments or
cancellation.
In 1975, the Energy Research and Development Administra1"See Uranium Enrichment, supra note 71, at 731; see also Radical Surgery, supra
note 10.
,' See H.R. REP. No. 91-1036, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 24 (1970). Congress
abandoned the Clinch River Project in 1983 after the expenditure of more than $1.5
billion. 129 CONG. REC. S14613-44 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1983); Breeder: After the Vote,
What?, NUCLEAR INDUSTRY (Nov. I1, 1983).
' See Cook, supra note 98, at 88.
See Pulling the Nuclear Plug, TIME, Feb. 13, 1984, at 34-35; see also Quirk &
Terasawa, Nuclear Regulation: An Historical Perspective, 21 NAT. RES. J. 833, 836
(1981).
" See Cook, supra note 98, at 88.
"

OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,

NUCLEAR POWER IN AN

AGE OF UNCER-

(OTA - E 216, Feb. 1984) ("ln]o nuclear plant now operating or still under
active construction has been ordered since 1974 and every year since then has seen a
decrease in the total utility commitment to nuclear power"). Certainly the plethora of
enrichment orders spawned by AEC's LTFC contract were out of touch with economic
reality. The same could be said for the splurge of resources going into efforts to stimulate
world-wide production of uranium.
TAINTY
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tion [hereinafter ERDA] (AEC's successor) declared an "open
season," during which customers could cancel contracts or adjust quantities or delivery schedules without charge. 3 6 However,
the ability of ERDA customers to reduce their enrichment commitments to actual requirements was limited by a number of
factors. ERDA, for example, stressed that the "open season"
was a once-and-for-all offer and that further upward adjustments would not be allowed. Thus, customers continued to
contract for their maximum possible requirements rather than
their best estimates. In addition, initial core deliveries could not
be deferred beyond fiscal year 1984. Other constraints were also
imposed. 1 7 One expert estimated that "post-open season" enriched fuel requirements - as reflected in ERDA contracts still exceeded by 30 to 50% what in retrospect were already
38
overly optimistic expectations of nuclear fuel needs.
By 1977, pressure had again built for yet further changes to
the Government's contracting policy. On June 15, 1977, ERDA
wrote the Joint Committee, this time proposing changes to the
basic enrichment criteria. ERDA postponed issuance of the criteria pending a hearing before the Senate Energy and Natural
Resources Committee, the successor in the Senate to the Joint
Committee.' 3 9 During this delay, ERDA was folded into the
DOE, and DOE prepared, in draft form, a new contract, denominated the Adjustable Fixed Commitment [hereinafter AFC]
Contract.1' The AFC contract contained a number of features
intended to better fit actual enrichment needs to enrichment
commitments. The lead-time for contract execution was cut from
eight to six years and the firm commitment period was cut from
10 to 5 years. Certain additional flexibility was provided.' 4' At
the hearing the AFC contract drew support from the utility
community as a step toward correcting the wide imbalance be" See 1973 Hearings, supra note 69, at 806-07 (reprinting January 1975 announcement); 1978 Hearings, supra note 10, at 179.
See 1978 Hearings, supra note 10, at 180.
See Id. at 180 (figure 2).
'I ld. at 1.
'i, See id. at 244.
id. at 31-33.
' Id. at 31-33. Another impetus for the AFC contract was President Carter's nonproliferation policy, which had as one cornerstone an assured source of supply of nuclear
fuel from the United States. The AFC contract, by reducing some contractual commitments,
freed some federal enrichment capacity to meet this assurance. See Bujon, supra note
10, at 3.
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tween enrichment commitments and actual needs, although util42
ities noted that "even greater flexibility is needed."'
G. Further Efforts to Put Humpty Together Again: The New
U.S. Enrichment Contract
While schedule delays continued the surpluses of enriched
uranium and natural uranium continued to accumulate. By 1983,
privately held stocks of enrichment and natural uranium in the
United States approximated four to five years of requirements.
(DOE stocks, which were procured prior to 1970, are reportedly
roughly equivalent.) Moreover, DOE's costs continued to increase
and DOE's construction of the now unneeded gas centrifuge facility
continued. Eurodif and Urenco, two foreign government consortia, were offering enrichment services on terms more attractive than those which could be obtained from DOE. The agency
was facing even stiffer competition on the secondary market
from utilities selling unneeded enriched uranium at prices well
below those offered by the federal government. DOE's requirements contract customers were deserting the agency in favor of
these more attractive alternatives as well as for nationalistic
reasons.,,3 The agency's other customers were busily calculating
whether it was cheaper to stay with DOE or to pay the hefty termination charges specified in their contracts and procure enrichment
services from Europe or on the secondary market. Sherry Peske,
DOE's enrichment marketing director, calculated that the agency
had lost "20 contracts in total since 1979, with a revenue value
of more than $5 billion, and we have lost over $2 billion in partial terminations of the requirements contracts."' DOE was forced
to frankly acknowledge that its policies were seriously flawed. In
the words of Assistant Secretary Brewer:
The United States has not operated [the] enrichment enterprise
as a business, with sound business practices. Over the years,
-2 Id. at 121 (testimony of John Kearny, Vice President of Edison Electric Institute).
., See Einbund, Foreign Enrichment of Uranium for U.S. Nuclear Utilities, PUn.
UT. FORT. April 13, 1983 at 43; DOE Revises the Uranium Enrichment Program, Pun.

UrnL.

FORT., March 15, 1984 at 47.
'- Business Panel, supra note 2, at 61. Eighteen of 20 cancellations involved West
German, Spanish, Swedish or Swiss interests. The two cancelled domestic contracts
involved Public Service of New Hampshire's troubled Seabrook facilities. West German
business went to Urenco, which is owned in part by West Germany. Spanish business
went in large part to Eurodif, which is owned in part by Spain.

1986]

FEDERAL URANIUM ENRICHMENT PROOAM

we have misread and, in some cases, disregarded the market.
We have handcuffed ourselves with contracting and marketing
constraints, either real or imagined, and we have acted as
though we are monopolists when we are not ....
[L]arge
mortgages were incurred which have to be picked up in the
rate base.

'

41

DOE finally had started to address the mismatch of actual
demand with its enrichment program.
On January 18, 1984, after negotiations with its utility customers, the agency adopted another new contract - the "Utility
Services" or "US" Enrichment Contract.'1 The agency described its new contract as a requirements contract.' 4 7 DOE
allowed fixed commitment customers electing to convert a onetime opportunity to reduce without penalty their commitments
to the agency for FY 1985-86 by roughly 30% and to eliminate

fixed commitments after FY 1986.' 48 In addition, under the new
contract, customers were obligated to take only 7006 of their

"requirements" from DOE. The remainder could be satisfied
from other sources; preferably, DOE hopes the difference will
come from the secondary market of SWU's so as to work off
the enrichment surplus and remove its destabilizing effect." 9
DOE also offered to be bound by a ceiling price of $135, subject
to escalation for electricity and the purchasing power of the
dollar.50 On September 4, 1985, the actual price was reduced
effective October 1 to $125/SWU.'5 l The contract was enthusiastically received by DOE's customers. Duke Power led the

'"I Uranium Enrichment Policy: Hearings Before the Energy Conservation & Power
Subcomm. of the House Energy & Commerce Comm., 98th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 10,
188 (1983-84) [hereinafter 1983-84 Hearings].
GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 4.
"WSee Energy and Water Development Appropriation for 1985, Part 6: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Energy and Water Development of the House Appropriations
Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 901, 907, 994 (1984) (testimony of DOE Assistant Secretary
Brewer).
141See DOE, Questions and Answers on the Terms and Conditions for Conversion
to the Utility Services (US) Contract for Uranium Enrichment Services 3 (Q/A 14) (Feb.
16, 1984) [hereinafter DOE Questions and Answers].
I" A major purpose of the contract is "to dry up the secondary market as quickly
as possible." Radical Surgery, supra note 10; see also Business Panel, supra note 2, at
14.
DOE Questions and Answers, supra note 148, at Q/A G. 54.
Answer to Question 7(C) attached to Letter from R. G. Rabben (DOE) to
Chairman Udall (December 13, 1985).
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charge, signing a new Utility Services Contract on February 6,
1984.112 The impact of the new contract in erasing artificial
demand for enrichment is significant indeed. Some experts estimate that it cuts actual demand for uranium by tens of millions
of pounds over the next 5 to 10 years.' 3
The DOE, conscious that it was required by statute to recover
costs over a reasonable period of time and that it cannot lawfully
cut its price without controlling its costs, started to carefully
review its programs. The agency finally stopped work on the
Portsmouth gas centrifuge after an investment of $2.7 billion.
The DOE expected at least $4.0 billion would be required for
completion and the competitiveness of the facility was uncertain.'5 4 On June 5, 1985, the agency also decided to place the
Oak Ridge gaseous diffusion [hereinafter GD] enrichment facility
5
on standby in order to save costs.1
DOE's new contract has drawn praise from the electric utility
industry and the agency's cost-shaving measures were acknowledged by a special House Tri-Committee Business Advisory
Panel.' 5 6 Indeed, the Panel reported that it "applaud[s] the
transition to a more business like approach that has taken place
s
at DOE and strongly endorses its continuation.'"
11.

SOME LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO

DOE's

NEW

URANIuM ENRICHMENT CONTRACT

A.

Compliance with the Section 161v. Criteria

Section 161v. of the AEA requires DOE enrichment services
to be provided in accordance with written "criteria," previously
submitted for 45-day review before Congress, "setting forth the
terms and conditions" under which toll enrichment is to be
Business Panel, supra note 2, at 137.
See ANDERSON (OF NUEXCO), ENRICHED URANIUM
INDUSTRY (Sept. 1984); NUCLEAR RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL,
AND THE U.S. URANIUM INDUSTRY (Sept. 1984).
'

SALES

DOE

EFFECT ON

SUPPLY

ENRICHMENT POLICIES

" See Hearing Before the Energy and Env. Subcomm. of House Interior & Insular
Affairs Comm., 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (Oct. 22, 1985) (statement of John R. Longenecker
(DOE)).
" Id. at 5.
The Panel was chaired by Mr. William Lee, Chairman of Duke Power, a strong
proponent of the Utility Services Contract and a major user (up to 6% of DOE sales)
of DOE civilian enrichment sales. See Business Panel, supra note 2, at 237-39.
" Id. at XIV.
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provided. The legislative history indicated that the terms and
conditions of the criteria "would be such matters as the charges
for enrichment services, the conditions under which such services
would be offered, and the general features of standard contracts
for uranium enrichment service."' 58 AEC's criteria issued pursuant to Section 161v. are the functional equivalent of regulations. '19

The rule that an agency action in violation of a governing
statute' °0 or regulation 6' is null and void is no less true in the
area of agency contracts: 62 "[W]hen an agent of the government
enters a contract that does not satisfy statutory or regulatory
conditions, the courts cannot bind the government to the contract."'' 6 The DOE's uranium enrichment contract will be unlawful if it violates the existing criteria issued under Section

161v. irrespective of whether the existing criteria are inconsistent
with DOE efforts to preserve or to maximize the United States
market share or are for some other reason outdated. The question of DOE's compliance with the applicable criteria for enrichment is of critical importance in determining whether the
agency's new "Utility Services" contract complies with the law.
" H.R. REP. No. 1702, 88th Cong. 2d Sess. 16 (1964); S. REP. No. 1325, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess., 16 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 3105,

3121.
At the time the "criteria" were issued, the AEC was subject to the requirements
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1973); Siegel v.
AEC, 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Ordinarily matters of general applicability such as
the enrichment criteria would be subject to informal notice-and-comment rulemaking
under 5 U.S.C. § 553. However, § 553(a)(2) contains an exception to this norm for
matters relating to contracts and sale of government property or services. Thus AEC
never formally invoked APA rulemaking procedures in issuing either its criteria or its
standard enrichment contracts. However, the agency did in effect propose the criteria
for public comment through the 45-day congressional review process, and, until issuance
of the new U.S. enrichment contract, accompanied each change in basic contract instruments with a criteria change for which 45-day congressional review was had.
1- 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) & (C) (1977); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864,

873 (1977); City of Santa Clara, Cal. v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 677 (9th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1979).
"' Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535,
539-40 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957); Brown Express, Inc. v. United

States, 607 F.2d 695, 703 (5th Cir. 1979); Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507
F.2d 1107, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'1 See also Schweiker v. Hanson, 450 U.S. 785 (1981), reh'g denied, 451 U.S. 1032

(1981). Compare Augusta Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d 445, 448 (11th Cir.
1982) (statute) with Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 386 (1947)
(regulations).
''

Augusta Aviation Inc. v. United States, 671 F.2d at 449.
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DOE's compliance with the applicable criteria is, on the one
hand clear, and on the other, cloudy. Without a doubt, DOE is
not in compliance with the 1973 criteria that were in force prior
to the agency's promulgation of new criteria on July 29, 1986.
It is equally clear that DOE is in compliance with its July 29
criteria, portions of which have been suspended by the Appropriations Committees in the context of the Continuing Resolution
adopted in the closing days of the 99th Congress, DOE's July 29
criteria, however, do not comply with the substantive requirements of Section 161v. of the AEA. Accordingly, even though
Congress did not suspend DOE's new criteria, the ultimate lawfulness of the agency's new criteria and its enrichment contract
is in doubt.
1. DOE's New Contract Under the Pre-July 1986 Criteria
The General Accounting Office has repeatedly asserted that
DOE's new contract does not comport with the pre-1986 criteria.
GAO's analysis was originally made in response to an inquiry
from Chairman John Dingell of the House Energy and Commerce Committee and then-Chairman Richard Ottinger of the
Subcommittee on Energy Conservation and Power. GAO's conclusions are set forth in a letter to Messrs. Dingell and Ottinger
dated December 27, 1984. The letter identifies several inconsistencies between DOE's contract and the then-existing criteria. For
simplicity, only two primary concerns are considered.
First, the pre-1986 criteria provided that "[tihe primary contracting vehicle for DOE to supply enrichment services for nuclear power reactors on a long-term basis shall be a Fixed
Commitment contract."' 4 In contrast, GAO notes that DOE
"has repeatedly referred to the Utility Services Contract as a
requirements type contract." ' 165 This GAO criticism is unmistakably apposite. The trend of the federal government's enrichment
program since introduction of the 1973 "fixed commitment"
criteria and LTFC contract has been a slow return to a require'" GAO letter, supra note 24, at 6 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 28876 (1979)).
Id. at 6 (citing Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, House Appropriation Comm., 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 901, 907, 916, 994 (1984)
(testimony of Mr. Shelby T. Brewer, Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy, Energy
and Water Development Appropriation for 1985, Part 6)).
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ments-based contract. DOE has admitted as much.' 66 Moreover,
DOE repeatedly has testified to Congress that its "new contracts
are based on individual customer needs rather than on fixed
commitments.... ,7

Indeed, Assistant Secretary Brewer frankly

declared that the new US contract "is a requirement contract
based on a customer's actual needs, not a fixed commitment to
accept unneeded SWU's over a long period of time." ' ' 68 Consonant with DOE's characterization, the Utility Services Contract
speaks in term of a customer's requirements, and specifies only
that a portion of these requirements be procured from DOE. As
the United States District Court in Western Nuclear v. Huffman
has accurately observed,
[tihe new utility services contract is clearly not a Fixed Commitment Contract. Rather, it states that the customer shall
purchase a percentage [to be agreed upon by the parties but

no less than seventy percent] of the Customer's requirements.
This language creates a 'requirements' contract. 69
In short, DOE's new contract is precisely the opposite genre
from that specified in the pre-1986 criteria.
Second, GAO notes that the pre-1986 criteria do not contain
any provisions authorizing a guaranteed ceiling price. The Utility
Services Contract contains a guaranteed ceiling price.' 70 GAO
1 See, e.g., id. at 6; Business Panel, supra note 2, 59-61 (Sherry Peske describes
AFC contract as "kind of halfway between requirements and long-term fixed commitment.").

I"Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Environment, House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985) (statement of Shelby T.
Brewer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Uranium Enrichment). The requirements
nature of the contract is also repeatedly made manifest in DOE, Questions and Answers
on the Terms and Conditions for Conversion to the Utility Services (US) Contract for
Uranium Enrichment Services, Feb. 16, 1984 (Q/A 13, 14, B.7, E.18, and Y.29).
- 1983-84 Hearings, supra note 145, at 188.
" Western Nuclear v. Huffman, No. 84-C-2315, Slip Op. at 2-3 (D. Colo. Sept.
30, 1985)); see also Mason v. United States, 615 F.2d 1343, 1346 (Ct. Cl. 1980), (citing
Media Press, Inc. v. United States, 566 F.2d 1191 (Ct. Cl. 1977)); Bank of America
National Trust and Savings Ass'n v. Smith, 336 F.2d 528, 529 n.1 (9th Cir. 1964);
Shader Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 276 F.2d 1, 4 (Ct. Cl. 1960). A requirements
contract can also be for only a part of the buyer's requirements. See, e.g., City of
Louisville v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 482 F.2d 159, 164 (6th Cir. 1973).
"' The Utility Services Contract guarantees that DOE will not charge a price higher
than $135/SWU. This ceiling price may be adjusted to reflect changes in DOE's costs
for electricity and the GNP Deflator. See Business Panel. supra note 2, at 65.
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argues that this represents an inconsistency with the pre-1986
criteria. In a nutshell, GAO argues that:
[a] guaranteed ceiling price is a very material provision of a
contract, particularly when the ceiling price appears to be
below [DOE's] current costs of providing enrichment services
and [DOE's] program statute requires recovery of its costs over
a reasonable period of time.' 7'
GAO points out that the pre-1986 criteria do not authorize a
ceiling price; Congress forced the AEC to narrow its 1973 criteria
and in response AEC specifically deleted authorization for a
ceiling price. More to the point, GAO observes that
[t]he AEC's rationale [for the deletion] was that a guaranteed
ceiling charge could preclude compliance with the statutory
directive to recover the Government's costs over a reasonable
period of time should the Government have to72undertake the
construction of additonal enrichment capacity.'
GAO then argues that
the concern which prompted the AEC to delete the guaranteed
ceiling price provisions from the criteria in 1973 is still applicable today, namely, the fear that a guaranteed ceiling price
could preclude compliance with both the statutory and criteria
directive to recover the Government's costs over a reasonable
period of time.'
For these and other reasons, the GAO has concluded
that [DOE] should have amended its uranium enrichment services criteria to conform them to the anticipated provisions of
the Utility Services Contract, because the new contract includes
or are not specifically auprovisions that either conflict with
4
7
thorized by the current criteria.

,7,
GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 7.
"12Id. at 8.

"" Id. at 8-9. GAO also raised other objections, including the non-compliance of
the termination charges with the pre-1986 criteria requirement that they be related to costs
(id. at 7) and inclusion of a "variable tails assay options" or VTAO in the absence of
any express authorization.
"I d. at 9 (GAO reiterated this view in its testimony, Hearing Before the Energy
and Environment Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th

Cong., IstSess. 5 (March 21, 1985) (statement of Daniel C. White).
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The Western Nuclear court agreed, noting that a ceiling price
provision "was deliberately deleted [from the criteria] in 1973
because of concern that a ceiling price would preclude compliance with the statutory directives that the government must
recover its costs over a reasonable period of time." 75 The district
court declared the Utility Services Contract null and void, in a
ruling affecting more than $20 billion worth of contract commitments.7 6 DOE has appealed.'
2.

Compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act as
Modified by the DOE Organization Act

In addition to the substantive requirements specified in the
criteria issued pursuant to Section 161v. of the AEA, DOE's
activities with respect to its enrichment program must generally
comply with the provisions of the APA. This obligation arises
from the Atomic Energy Act, 7 8 and the specific requirement of
DOE's organic act.' 9 Indeed, Section 501(a)(1) of the DOE
Act 80 requires all DOE rules and regulations, or orders having
with
the applicability and effect of a rule, to comply not only
8'
requirements.'
additional
certain
with
the APA, but also
The initial question is whether DOE's standard contract, or
at least its generic terms and conditions, constitute a rule for
APA purposes. The APA defines "rules" to mean
the whole or a part of an agency statement of general or
particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy . . . includ[ing] the
approval or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices,
facilities, appliances, services or allowances therefore or of

Id. (citing 1973 Hearings, supra note 9, at 446).
Doubts Pervade Nuclear Fuel Industry, Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1985, at 6, col. l.
'Western Nuclear, No. 84-C-2315 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 1985), appeal docketed, No.
86-1942 (Sept. 24, 1985).
-" 42 U.S.C. § 2231 (1973).
"9 Section 501 of the Department of Energy Organization (DOE) Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7191(a)(1)(1973).
42 U.S.C. § 7191(a)(1) (1973).
"
The additional requirements are found in section 501(b) & (c). These include
special notice, analysis, disclosure, and public hearing requirements. 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)
& (c) (1973).
"7
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valuation, costs or accounting, or practices bearing on any of
the foregoing. 182
A standard contract intended to be of general applicability,
or at least its generic terms and conditions, clearly fits this
definition. A new standard contract, or at least the new significant features thereof, is generic in nature, and is "designed to
implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy" with respect to
toll enrichment. It amounts to the "prescription for the future
of prices, facilities, . . . services, . . . or practices bearing on"
enrichment services.'8 3 As a corollary, "criteria" of general applicability governing DOE's enrichment contracts also fit this definition.
Having decided that a new standard enrichment contract is
a rule, the next question is to determine the APA's impact on
DOE's actions. The most significant APA provision applicable
to agency rulemaking is the notice and comment rulemaking
procedures embodied in section 553 of the APA.' Rules relating
to contracts and sales of government services, however, are
excepted from the notice and comment rulemaking requirement.' 8 5 Notwithstanding this exception, Congressman Dingell,
following a recommendation of a committee of the American
Bar Association, 8 6 inserted language into the DOE organic act
overriding this exception with respect to all DOE rules relating
to contracts and sales of services. 8 7 The Dingell Amendment,
codified in Section 501(b)(3) of the DOE Act,8 8 renders DOE's
rules, regulations or orders with respect to public property,
loans, grants, or contracts, subject to notice and comment rulemaking requirements specified in 5 U.S.C. § 553. As GAO has
5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1977).
The new generic contract and many of the "criteria" relating thereto clearly
affect rates for enrichment services. Ratemaking is generally recognized to constitute
rulemaking for purposes of the APA. See, e.g., United States v. Tex-La Electric
Cooperative, Inc., 693 F.2d 392, 401 n.12 (5th Cir. 1982); Colorado River Energy
Distributors Ass'n v. Lewis, 526 F. Supp. 926, 932 (D.D.C. 1981).
- 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1977).
5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2) (1977).
See Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1970).
"1 123 CONG. REC. H5325 (daily ed. June 2, 1977) (Mr. Dingell offers amended §§
501-02); see H. R. CONF. REP. No. 95-539, 95th Cong., IstSess., 83 (1977) (adopting
modification of House version).
- 42 U.S.C. § 7191(b)(3) (1973).
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found, DOE made no attempt to comply with either the rulemaking requirements specified in the APA as made applicable
by the Dingell Amendment, or other requirements specified in
8
Section 501 of the DOE Act.

9

The uranium enrichment criteria extant prior to adoption of
the DOE Act of 1977 are not affected by Section 501 by reason
of the savings clause in Section 705 (a) of the DOE Act.190 Thus,
if the Utility Services Contract complied with the 1973 criteria,
DOE would have an argument that issuance of the new contract
does not trigger notice and comment rulemaking. GAO, however, has identified several particulars in which the new contract
contains generic provisions which either violate or are not authorized by the existing criteria. 9' These generic provisions are
intended to be of general applicability. Any one of these would
appear sufficient to warrant the rulemaking procedures.
An agency action taken in violation of applicable notice and
comment rulemaking requirements is null and void. 92 For example, in State of Florida v. Matthews,' 93 a district court invalidated certain actions by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) relating to property and contracts on the
ground that the actions constituted rules and the exception under
Section 553(a)(2) of the APA was, as here, unavailable to the
agency.' 94 Consonant with this analysis, GAO has indicated its
view that DOE acted in contravention of the APA and Section
501 of the DOE Act in taking at least some of the actions
embodied in the new utility contract. 91

'

GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 5.

42 U.S.C. § 7295(a) (1973).
E.g., GAO Letter, supra note 24.
NRDC v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Brown Express, Inc. v.
United States, 607 F.2d at 703; Pickus v. United States Board of Parole, 507 F.2d at
1114; American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 400-01 (D.D.C.
1983); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 515.16 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see
also supra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
" 422 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1976).
" State of Florida v. Matthews, 442 F. Supp. at 1250. See also Rodway v. United
States Dep't of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency which adopts
regulation making (a)(2) exception unavailable must thereafter comply with notice and
comment rulemaking requirements).
"I See GAO Letter, supra note 24, at II. It is interesting to note that DOE proposed
its generic contract for disposal of spent nuclear fuel for comment, treating it as a rule
for purposes of the APA. Compare 48 Fed. Reg. 5458 (1983) with 48 Fed. Reg. 16590
(1983) (promulgating 10 CFR Part 961).
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DOE's chief legal argument against this line of reasoning
was that its Utility Services Contracts are custom-tailored individual applications resulting from customer-specific negotiations
rather than contracts of general application.1'9 But there seems
little question that these "individualized negotiated agreements"
were based on the generic Utility Services Contract and that the
terms and conditions in each of the individual contracts are
similar to the generic pattern.' 97 Indeed, John Longenecker, DOE
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Enrichment, when explaining the
new Utility Services Contract, testified that "[w]e do not have
the flexibility in the U.S. enrichment enterprise to do predatory
pricing, to treat customers differently, [or] to tailor-make con98
tracts.1"
3.

The Impact of the July 29, 1986 Criteria

Although DOE contends that its existing contract complies
with the pre-1986 criteria and that its issuance did not violate
the notice and comment rulemaking requirements of the APA,
the agency in January 1986 proposed and within six months
promulgated new enrichment criteria. The new criteria clearly
are intended to apply retroactively to moot the various grounds
on which the lawfulness of DOE's new uranium enrichment
contract has been challenged. For example, the July 29, 1986
criteria purport to immunize all the agency's prior contracts.
Section 762.15 of the new criteria expressly states that "[a]ll
contracts under which DOE was providing enrichment services
prior to the adoption of these criteria are valid . . . [and] [tihese
prior contracts may be amended to conform to these criteria
without penalty, if both parties agree.' 99
DOE's action poses a number of analytical difficulties. If
the criteria are lawful, they may well moot the claim that the
' See GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 5; see also Western Nuclear v. Huffman, D.
Colo. No. 84-C-2315 (declaration of Sherry E. Peske "the contracts are individualized
negotiated agreements" and "deviations from [the proposed generic contract) are substantial and material").
-' In any event, if DOE in fact were adopting an individualized approach to
enrichment contracting, the agency would appear to be in violation of the requirement
in section 161v. that prices for services rendered domestic customers "shall be established
on a nondiscriminatory basis." 42 U.S.C. § 2201v(B)(i) (1973).
"'
Business Panel, supra note 2 at 6 (emphasis added).
51 Fed. Reg. at 27146 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 762.15).
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new enrichment contract was issued in violation of notice and
comment requirements and the pre-existing criteria. 2°° However,
the question remains as to whether the new enrichment criteria
are lawful. In particular, DOE expressly indicates in the preamble to its proposed criteria, and the President's Fiscal Year 1987
budget confirms, that under the new criteria the agency will
"write-off" some $4.1 billion in prior unrecovered costs of
providing enrichment services to civilian customers.2 °' In addition, the criteria purport to afford DOE discretion to alter the
"write-off" amount either upward or downward, upon consideration of such factors as "market share, need to reduce the
deficit, [and] reliability of service at competitive prices. "202 Furthermore, DOE claims discretion to determine what future costs
are "appropriate" to recover from its customers. 203 GAO has
testified that the purported "write-off" violates the full-cost
recovery requirement of Section 161v. of the Atomic Energy
Act, and that the agency's claim of discretion with respect to
additional past and future costs is also impermissible under the
Act. 201 GAO has also indicated that the numerous points of
discretion claimed by DOE under its new proposed criteria in
essence render oversight of DOE's performance by GAO - and
by Congress - all but impossible. This latter criticism is particularly alarming, for it defeats the basic purpose of the criteria
requirement embodied in Section 161v.. 20
If the new criteria are in fact contrary to Section 161v., they
cannot serve to immunize DOE's enrichment policies from litigation advancing claims of substantive deficiencies. DOE appears to be relying on two arguments to protect its position from
substantive attack. First, the agency appears to claim that if
See San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1314 & 1317
(D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated and reh'g granted en banc on other grounds, 760 F.2d 1320
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (reference to other proceedings satisfactory, and relief would serve no
practical purpose).
"I See also DOE Memorandum, Unrecovered Government Investment, August lI,

1986. Compare 51 Fed. Reg. 3629 (1986) with OMB,

MAJOR POLICY INMATIVS

51 Fed. Reg. 27145 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 762.6).
S0

a'

(1986).

Id.

Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy and the Env. of the House Interior
and Insular Affairs Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of Keith Fultz
(GAO)).
Id. at 3-4.
I-'1
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Congress does not suspend the criteria by legislation, 2 ° then it
should be deemed to have "acquiesced" and thereby ratified its
treatment of the issue. " "
Even in the absence of any congressional action, DOE's position
seem difficult. To be sure, there is a line of cases (starting with the
Supreme Court's decision in Power Reactor Development Company)2°s holding that an interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act
by the old Atomic Energy Commission, which was presented to,
and reviewed by the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy,
is entitled to great deference. 209 However, Congressional inaction
in today's environment should not carry such great weight.
Because the AEC realized that the Joint Committee could relatively
easily pass legislation barring Commission action, requirements
such as Section 161v. providing for AEC initiatives to "lie before"
or be presented to the Joint Committee were extremely effective in
maintaining Congressional control over the agency." ' Under these

circumstances Joint Committee inaction could in general be inferred to constitute approval. However, after the break-up of the
Joint Committee in 1977, oversight was spread among a number of
committees in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. 21' This fracturing of authority is further compounded by
a dilution of power on the part of the authorizing committees
in favor of the appropriation committees in the legislative process.
Congressional action to remedy agency conduct not in compliance with existing law in the atomic energy area has thus
become much more difficult. In fact, Congress' ability to assure
compliance with statutory requirements in the relevant area is
now no greater than in any other area in which Congress has
delegated to an agency and courts are called upon for judicial

Under INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), the new criteria can be disapproved

-

only by enacting legislation.
0,

Cf. Brief for Appellants (DOE, et al) at 30-36, Western Nuclear v. Huffman,

No. 86-1942 (10th Cir. Sept. 24, 1985) (appeal docketed).
-" Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine
Makers, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
Id. at 408-09; see also New Hampshire v. AEC, 406 F.2d 170, 174 n.5
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 962 (1969).
2" Green, The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: A Model for Legislative Reform, 32 GEo. WASH. L. Rav. 932, 939 (1964).
2" 42 U.S.C. § 2258 (1986).
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review. Consequently, no special weight should be given to possible Congressional inability to overturn the criteria.
More to the point, Congress' response to the July 29, 1986
criteria has been highly critical and can hardly be deemed acquiesence or ratification. The full Senate adopted language of
the Senate version of the debt ceiling legislation (House Jt. Res.
497) disapproved DOE's July 29 criteria.21 2 A free-standing House
21
Joint Resolution (No. 699) to similar effect was introduced 1
and cleared both the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee and
the Energy and Commerce Committee. 14 In the rush to adjournment, the two efforts were not linked. However, the House
Appropriations Committee agreed to language depriving DOE
of funds to carry out certain features of the criteria bearing on
the enrichment of foreign-source uranium pending a judicial
resolution of that issue. 15 Numerous floor statements and colloquies indicated that this action was to be taken as neutral on
disputes concerning the lawfulness of DOE's new enrichment
criteria and the purported write-off of $4.1 billion in enrichment
216
debt.

2 See 132 CONG. REC. S10131 & S10168 (daily ed. August I, 1986) (statements by
Senators Domenici, Garn and Bingaman); 132 CONG. REC. S11089 (daily ed. August 9,
1986) (adoption). Senator Domenici favored disapproval of the criteria principally because he felt that the enrichment debt should be reduced to $350,00,000. Senators Garn
and Bingaman expressed concern that the write-off embodied in the criteria was beyond
DOE's power and that DOE had failed to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic
uranium industry as required under Section 161v. of the AEA.
"1 132 CONo. REc. H5697 (daily ed. August 7, 1986) (introduction); id. at E2795
(daily ed. August 8, 1986) (statement by principal sponsor, Mr. Richardson).
"I See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. H8619 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1986), announcing H.
Rept. 99-926, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. I.
211123 CONG. REC. H10844-45 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (Conference Report on H.
R. Res. 738, the Continuing Resolution).
211 123 CONG. REC. H10960 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986) (Cong. Conte: no interference
with pending litigation); id. Hl1042 (Cong. Young: "I wish to stress that the Congress
is in no way, and I repeat in no way, approving the new criteria, nor DOE's new
). Congressman Markey asserted that the Continuing Resolution
enrichment contract ....
"ratifies the disapproval action of the Committees of jurisdiction." 123 CONG. REC.
H10972 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). He was especially critical of "the $4 billion taxpayer
ripoff." Id. H10973; see also 123 CoNG. REc. E3766 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 1986) (Cong.
Cheny: Congress "in no way endorses DOE's enrichment criteria, or condones the
"); id.
Department conduct in flouting the specific requirement of section 161v ....
E3724-25 (Cong. Hansen: Generally critical of DOE); 123 CONG. REc. S16633 (daily ed.
Oct. 16, 1986) (colloquy between Mr. Garn and Mr. Domenici: "no intent to alter
Section 161v."); id. 16638 (colloquy between Mr. Helms and Mr. Domenici: neutral on
validity of contracts).
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Tennessee Valley Authority v. HilP'7 is closely on point. In
that case, the Supreme Court rejected the argument that continued appropriations for the Tellico Dam constituted Congressional ratification of that project notwithstanding its conflict
with the Endangered Species Act. 218 The Court explained that
repeals by implication are disfavored 2 9 and that this doctrine is
especially applicable where "the claimed repeal rests solely on
an Appropriation's Act. ' 220 "When voting on appropriation
measures," the Court said, "legislators are entitled to operate
under the assumption that the funds will be devoted to purposes
which are lawful and not for any purpose forbidden. '22' Moreover, "[e]xpressions of committees dealing with requests for
appropriations cannot be equated with statutes enacted by Congress. .... ,,22 It follows that the partial suspension of the new
criteria by the Appropriations Committees can not be deemed
ratification of criteria violating the law, particularly in view of
rejection of the criteria by the full Senate and the two House
authorization committees with principal jurisdiction.
This still leaves DOE a second argument, which is that the
agency enjoys the flexibility to write-off unrecovered government
investment in order to remain competitive, increase its market
share, or achieve other market-oriented or foreign policy goals.
GAO takes the position that DOE lacks this flexibility. 223 As
amended in 1970, Section 161v. provides categorically that "any
prices established under this subsection shall be on a basis of
recovery of the Government's costs over a reasonable period of
time. .... ,,224 Under this provision, DOE's "uranium enrichment
program is required by statute to recover its costs. 2 2 5 On the
face of the statute, DOE's write-off would appear unlawful.
DOE's response focuses on the original 1966 criteria (adopted
pursuant to Section 161v.). The 1966 criteria provide that the
federal enrichment program must recover all costs, both direct
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
16. U.S.C. § 1531 (1982).
21 437 U.S. at 189.
220 Id. at 190.
221 Id.
222 Id. at 191.
21

21.

22 See, e.g., Statement of Keith Fultz, supra note 204.
2- 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v)(B)(iii) (1973).
225United States v. Consolidated Edison of New York, 452 F. Supp. 638, 657
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified. 580 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1978).
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and indirect, and specifically indicated that the program must
recover costs for "appropriate depreciation." The agency, relying on legislative history associated with the 1964 amendments,
argues that it enjoys flexibility.126 DOE at one time might have
enjoyed some flexibility to take write-offs, but for a number of
reasons that flexibility either no longer exists or is inapplicable.
First and foremost, the 1966 criteria were adopted at a time
when the statute provided for prices affording "reasonable compensation to the government." The Joint Committee directed
that this term be construed flexibly to take into account not only
the government's costs but also the national interest in the
development and utilization of nuclear power. The Joint Committee viewed as consistent with this approach AEC's action in
initially not recovering depreciation attributed to unused portions
of diffusion plants in order to meet the immediate problem of
a substantial decline in enrichment services needed for military
purposes. The statute, however, was amended in 1970 to curtail
the agency's flexibility. The 1966 criteria cannot be read in a
fashion inconsistent with the statute as amended. 227
2-"51 Fed. Reg. 3626 n.5 (1986). DOE formerly argued more narrowly that it was
inappropriate to recover depreciation for unused capacity for which a write-off may be
taken under General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP); see, e.g., Hearing Before
the Energy and Env. Subcomm. of the House Int. and Insular Affairs Comm., 99th
Cong., 1st. Sess. (1985) (DOE Answer to Question 8 propounded by Chairman Udall,
Prehearing Questions and Answers Relating to the October I1, 1985). It is not clear that
a write-off is appropriate under GAAP for the GD plants in question and it is even less
clear that GAAP is relevant at all to a government enterprise conducted under the
express requirement of Section 161v. More recently, DOE has broadened its claim to
discretion to go beyond GAAP.
22' In any event, it is far from clear that DOE's write-off would be consistent even
with the originial version of section 161v. For example, it is hard to argue that DOE's
write-off is necessary or desirable to promote the national interest in the development
and utilization of nuclear power. The only significant potential nexus between the stated
interest and DOE's write-off would be potentially promotional effects on nuclear development due to lower nuclear fuel prices allowed by the write-off. But the enrichment
portion of nuclear fuel costs are a relatively insignificant factor in the overall cost of
nuclear power (generally less than a fraction of 1%). Moreover, cheap nuclear fuel is
currently abundantly available at prices below DOE's price even after the write-off.
Thus, although cheaper DOE enrichment prices might marginally contribute to lowering
the overall cost of nuclear power (thereby promoting it), the chief beneficiary of the
write-off would not appear to be the promotion of nuclear power but rather DOE, in
that the write-off may assist in preserving or increasing DOE's share of the nuclear fuel
market. However, the Atomic Energy Act nowhere identifies the preservation and
expansion of the federal enrichment enterprise as a national goal. Indeed, since the
Nixon Administration, the stated goal of the federal government has been to get out of
the enrichment business. GAO is in accord:
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Moreover, to the extent that the Joint Committee in the
1960's recognized flexibility on the part of DOE to exclude
portions of the enrichment plant from depreciation and interest
charges, that flexibility was confined to plants previously constructed for military purposes. The original plant constructed
for military purposes was valued at approximately $2.0 billion.
According to GAO, the undepreciated balance of the original
three gaseous diffusion (GD) plants as of fiscal year 1971 was
about $1.0 billion, and some $0.7 billion of that amount had
been recovered from customers by. fiscal year 1983.2 8s The bulk
of GD investment written off by DOE would thus appear to be
associated with subsequent programs to upgrade the plants "to
increase their capacity and efficiency, specifically to benefit civilian customers."1229 The remaining investment written off by
the agency relates to the gas centrifuge plant, 30 another project
undertaken for the benefit of civilian customers. Nothing in the
legislative history suggests that DOE has discretion to write-off
investment undertaken specifically to benefit civilian customers.
AEC's flexibility in not pricing for full depreciation was
further constrained by the Conway Formula. The Conway Formula arose out of congressional hearings on the 1966 criteria.
AEC asserted that the policy of the criteria was one of full cost
recovery23 ' with one exception. That exception was that full depreciation would not be charged during an interim period because
the plants had been built for military purposes and the civilian
market had not yet expanded so as to fully utilize their capacity. The formula for depreciation and interest charges for the
interim period became known as the Conway Formula. This
formula required recovery of depreciation and interest charges
The nuclear industry is not threatened by current uranium enrichment
market conditions. . . . [I1t is not the development of atomic power that
is being impeded but the ability of the United States enrichment program
to compete in the world market under its legislative structure. This situation
does not fall within the one exception for which Congress [in 1964] approved less than full cost recovery.
GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 22.
Id. at 14.
I2
ld. The original capacity of the GD plants would be roughly adequate to serve
I2
all DOE's current military and civilian customers without the expensive CIP/CUP
upgrade. But for the upgrade, capacity utilization would be much higher and much of
this controversy averted.
2.'
Statement of Keith Fultz, supra note 204, at 3.
21 1966 Hearings, supra note 72, at 31, 32, 112.
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only to the extent of plant utilization plus 10076, but with a floor
of 30%. Once utilization reached 75%, 100% of depreciation
and interest costs were to be recovered.
GAO reports, and DOE admits,23 2 that DOE achieved 77.1%

utilization from its GD plants in 1976. From that point forward,
DOE was obligated to depreciate 100% of its plants under the
Conway Formula. As GAO points out,
the interim period in which the Conway Formula applied ...
expired [in 1976]. Thereafter, in accordance with the Conway
Formula, [DOE] should have recovered 100 percent of plant
and equipment depreciation from customers regardless of the
percentage of production capacity achieved in any given year.
In fact, from 1977 through 1983 [DOE] did include 100 percent
of depreciation in its prices, even though that percentage
of
233
production capacity never again reached 75 percent.
GAO concludes that DOE's write-offs are
not in accord with the statutory mandate of subsection 161v.
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2201(v), requiring cost recovery for [DOE's] uranium enrichment program. Therefore, we conclude that the write-off would
constitute a violation of the statute ....

If such assets are to

be written-off, Congress must amend the Act. A criteria change
would not suffice, since the criteria must be in accord with the
2 34

statute.

GAO's conclusion is entitled to special weight. When Congress amended Section 161v. in 1970 specifically to require full
cost recovery, the Joint Committee flatly declared that GAO
had "correctly discerned" Congress' intent. The Joint Committee "recommend[ed]" ' 35 that the federal enrichment enterprise
consult with GAO, and indeed "expect[ed]"

'

1

6

federal enrich-

ment officials to consult with GAO, prior to any revision of the
enrichment criteria. In a way, GAO is Congress' designated
exegete of the full cost recovery requirement. Its opinion concerning DOE's compliance with the full cost recovery require51 Fed. Reg. 27140 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 762).
GAO Letter, supra note 24, at 22.
, Id. at 13, 22.
2. H.R. REP. No. 91-1470, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5005.
2- Id. at 32, 33.
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ment in Section 161v. should be entitled to appropriate deference.
In short, the consistent and congressionally-approved interpretation of Section 161v. and the enrichment criteria as to recovery
of cost within ten years is entitled to deference " and thus places
DOE in an awkward position. DOE's recent revisionist interpretations of the Conway Formula are not consistent with prior construction, or with themselves. The agency has relied upon the Conway Formula both to vindicate charging its customers depreciation on the GD plants if it chooses to do so,8 and as a legal
basis to take write-offs notwithstanding the full cost recovery requirement. 3 9 It appears that DOE has taken action inconsistent
with the full cost recovery provision of Section 161v. with respect
2
to roughly $4.0 billion in taxpayer assets. 4.

A Word on Unrecovered Costs

Controversy raged throughout 1984 and 1985 concerning the
amount of unrecovered costs currently extant with regard to the
uranium enrichment program. As late as December of 1985,
"'

A consistent agency interpretation is highly persuasive as to the meaning of a

statute. See, e.g., 2A

SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

§ 49.07 at 393

(Sands 4th ed. 1984). This is especially so where Congress has specifically noted (see,
e.g., H.R. REP. No. 91-1470, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 25, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NFws 5005) that construction with approval when amending the statute.
Compare United States v. Groupp, 459 F.2d 178, 182 (lst Cir. 1972) (weight given to
administrative interpretation not upset by subsequent amendment of statute) with Public
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire v. NRC, 582 F.2d 77, 83 (1st Cir. 1978), cerl. denied, 439
U.S. 1046 (1979) (rule applied in Atomic Energy Act context). There are cases holding
that an agency is entitled to no deference when it abandons an earlier consistently held
view. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. United States, 209 F. Supp. 35, 41-42
(N.D.lII. 1962).
...See 51 Fed. Reg. 27140 (1986) (DOE rebuts Duke Power argument that the
agency is required under the Conway Formula not to charge for unused plant.).
2" DOE argues that Joint Committee toleration of the Conway Formula after 1970
despite the 1970 amendment to the statute establishing cost recovery as DOE's pricing
basis indicates that DOE has flexibility to "write-off" investment. See id. at 27138; see
also Business Panel, supra note 2, at 75 (Statement by Mr. Brewer). But there is an
easy response. The Conway Formula envisioned the ultimate recovery of all costs. It did
not envision permanent non-recovery, which is precisely what is contemplated in a "writeoff."
", DOE officials from time to time have suggested that their European competition
benefits from Government subsidies, such as "very, very favorable financing from their
Government." See, e.g., Business Panel, supra note 2, at 55. The write-off by DOE of
billions of dollars of federal investment in the form of capital expenditures and imputed
interest could readily be construed to be "very, very favorable financing" for DOE
from the United States Government and may raise problems under GATT for some
DOE export sales.
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DOE's position with respect to unrecovered costs was unclear.
At one point, DOE reportedly suggested that those costs were
much less than it currently admits and, more particularly, that
the sum which it should ultimately return to the Treasury was
only $788 million. 24' The basis for this amount is not clear but
it is approximately the undepreciated investment in GD plants
after DOE's original $1.2 billion GD write-off. 242 The question
of the amount of unrecovered costs was resolved within the
Executive Branch in January of 1986, when both the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) and DOE acknowledged GAO's
24
$7.5 billion figure. 1
The $7.5 billion figure, however, does not enjoy the concurrence of the nuclear utility industry. William Lee, a spokesman
for the nuclear utility industry and the Chairman of Duke Power
Company, contends that the debt is only $355 million - an
amount which he evidently believes is equivalent to the total of
net appropriations over the history of the commercial enrichment
program minus the full cost of supplying enriched uranium to
See, e.g.,

INSIDE ENERGY

(McGH) 3 (Dec. 16, 1985).

, According to the staff of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Committee,
DOE derived the figure as follows:
Total Appropriations
in Millions
For FY 72-84
Operating and other costs
$ 9,967
CIP/CUP
1,479
GCEP
2,709
Total
14,155
Minus (military requirements)
1,180
Minus (revenues)
12,188
$787, rounded to $788.
The DOE figure does not account for $4,049,000,000 in imputed interest and contains
a somewhat higher figure for military requirements than that espoused by, for example,
OMB. Private communication from Mr. Joseph Shorin to the author, Jan. 1986. According to staff for the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, DOE essentially called
for the write-off of $3.5 billion for GCEP since the agency argued that it was paid for
from revenues received as imputed interest. Id. But the imputed interest used for GCEP
is arguably equivalent to a positive net appropriation in that amount.
2" OMB, supra note 17; 51 Fed. Reg. 3629 (1986) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R.
762); see also id. at 15635. Part of the confusion concerning DOE's unrecovered costs
stems from the use of three different accounting systems: a financial statement system,
the pricing system, and the appropriation system. DOE uses the financial statement
system to provide financial accounting for the system. The appropriation system is used
by Congress to control program spending. The pricing system is used to determine price.
The three systems are quite different, although interconnected. For further details, see
Civiak (Cong. Research Service), Cost Accounting, Pricing and Cost Recovery in DOE's
Uranium Enrichment Program (Oct. 9, 1985).
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defense programs over that period.'" In fact, the utility industry
contested the larger sum in DOE's rulemaking concerning revised
uranium enrichment criteria, contending that the entire amount
should be forgiven on the theory that this was the intent of
Congress in approving DOE's annual appropriations over the
years.245
The bulk of the unrecovered costs is in the form of imputed
interest. Although DOE and its predecessors purported to charge
for imputed interest, 2 4 6 revenues from the sale of enriched uranium have not been used to repay imputed interest to the Treasury. Instead, the agency, with Congress' consent, reinvested
receipts in the enrichment program, chiefly to finance the upgrade of DOE's GD facilities and to build the now-cancelled
gas centrifuge."' Moreover, to the extent that the government did
', Letter from William Lee to Chairpersons Fuqua, Udall and Lloyd (Sept. 27,
1985); see also Letter from Mr. Carr (Assistant G.C. of Duke Power) to Messrs. McRae,
et al., (DOE) (Feb. 24, 1986). Chairpersons Fuqua, Udall and Lloyd responded to Mr.
Lee by a letter dated November 6, 1985, noting that GAO "reports that there is an
unrecovered balance in the enrichment program in excess of $6 billion. Most of this
balance ($4.6 billion) is due to federal investments after 1971," i.e., for commercial
purposes. Although the three Representatives agreed that some adjustment for services
to the defense sector "may be appropriate," they noted that "it is clear that a significant
sum would still be owed to the government." They added that "we ...believe that all
costs to the government should eventually be recovered." See NUCLEAR FUEL 8 (Dec. 1,
1985). Staff for the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee indicate that Mr. Lee
has ignored imputed interest. Private communication from Mr. Joseph Shorin to author
(Jan. 1986). Duke Power Company has filed a petition for review of DOE's July 29
enrichment criteria. See Duke Power Co. v. Department of Energy, No. 86-1522 (D.C.
Cir. filed Sept. 22, 1986) (DOE has moved to dismiss on the ground, among others that
the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 2239 and 28 U.S.C. § 2341.).
211Letter from Mr. Kearney (EEl) to U.S. DOE (Feb. 28, 1986). The utilities are
also pressing Mr. Lee's argument that more of the investment should be attributed to
defense or research and development. See, e.g., Letter from Mr. Carr to Messrs. McRae,
et al., (Feb. 24, 1986). DOE seems unimpressed with this position. See 51 Fed. Reg. at
15636 & n. 4 (1986) (arguing that Government customers have been imputedly charged
rates equivalent to commercial customers).
I" GAO has indicated that DOE and its predecessors may have been undercharging
their enrichment customers for a prolonged period. See GAO, "Information on DOE's
Costing and Pricing of Uranium Enrichment Services" 10, reprinted in 1983-84
Hearings, supra note 145, at 285 (DOE has not recovered costs in 9 out of 13 years
between FY 1971 and 1983; total costs per SWU in 1983 were $181.79 but average price
only $143.90).
...DOE is not open concerning what it has done with the revenues which it has
received from the enrichment program. The following exchange is illustrative:
Question 10: A. Exactly how much money in imputed interest charges has
DOE collected from its customers?
B. Why hasn't the Department returned imputed interest collected from its
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overbuild, the nuclear utilities cannot claim to have been innocent
bystanders. As the National Taxpayers Union has stressed, the
utilities urged the government to build the now unnecessary enrichment facilities, arguing that "the economic penalties that could
be imposed by a shortfall of enrichment capability far exceed the
248
costs that would be associated with a temporary oversupply ....
The most succinct recent summation of the various positions
of the key parties is a DOE memorandum entitled "Unrecovered
Government Investment." It explains the situation as follows
(figures in millions):
Nuclear
Utility
Industry DOE
1969 beginning balance
net cash flow
(i.e., net positive appropriations
from Congress)
adjustment for unfunded
government deliveries
(i.e., defense enrichment)
imputed interest

adjustments (i.e., write-offs)
admitted unrecovered costs

0
1600

150
1600

GAO
1500
1600

(1470)

(1200)

(1200)

220

5600

5600

350

7500

7500

0

4100

0

350

3400

7500

This summary is misleading only in that it suggests that the
utilities contend that the original plants were "transferred" in

customers to the Treasury to offset the government's cost of borrowing,
as prescribed by the General Accounting Office's Policy and Procedures
Manual for Guidance of Federal Agencies?
C. Precisely where in the program has DOE reinvested imputed interest
revenues?
Answer: From 1969 through 1984 we have imputed interest costs of $4,168

million. The revenues received from the recovery of imputed interest costs
were directed by Congress in appropriation acts to offset enrichment program costs.

Letter from R. G. Rabben (DOE) to Chairman Udall (December 13, 1985).
24 Hearings Before the Energy and Env. Subcomm. of the House Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (statement of B. Jeanine Hull
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1969 for free. Although some may take that position, the more
general view seems to be that a more complicated disavowal of
responsibility for investments incurred subsequent to 1969 (in the
form chiefly of recycled imputed interest and appropriation).
5. Congress
Congress has yet to come to grips with the situation that has
developed. Aside from efforts to determine what is happening
(no easy task given the difficulty associated with assembling
information in this area), Congressional concern to date has
tended to focus on: whether to require some initial payback of
the government investment and, if so, how much. 249 The payback

of any arbitrary amount may not actually reduce the amount of
unrecovered costs.

20

The only method to assure a reduction in

unrecovered costs is to require repayment of all the annual
imputed interest in each fiscal year, plus a portion of the underlying balance. In other words, the enrichment debt, if it is to
be paid off, must be handled in the same fashion employed by
(NTU) quoting testimony of Mr. Kuhns on behalf of the Edison Electric Institute in
Future Structure of the Uranium Enrichment Industry: Hearings Before the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 175 (1974)); see also 1978 Hearings,
supra note 10, at 80, 87, 444 (EEI statements in favor of gas centrifuge and opposing
GAO suggestion that investment in additional enrichment capacity be postponed); 198384 Hearings, supra note 145, at 315-26 (EEl continues to support construction program).
- For example, the original Senate budget reconciliation proposal in 1985 called
for a payment by the enrichment program to the Treasury - presumably in the form
of a net negative appropriation - of some of "the estimated $4.6 billion over the next
three years." S. CoN. RES. 32, !31 CONG. RES. 3424 (1985); see also S. REP. No. 9915, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. 93 (1985) (the Senate, in 1985, assumed that $4.6 billion
was the government's post-1971 investment in the uranium enrichment program).
-'1 In the words of Mr. Civiak of the Congressional Research Service,
[tihe repayment of prior investment is determined through the price setting
... system ....
A negative net appropriation, without a change in the
method of pricing of enrichment services, is not enough to ensure reducing
the Government investment in enrichment. The Government investment in
enrichment could increase or decrease depending upon how the ... excess
of revenues over obligations [needed to make the repayment] is produced.
It might be possible to achieve a negative net appropriation by selling
inventories of enriched uranium and reducing capital spending over the
period, while the net investment in enrichment grows from operating income on the balance sheet and/or continued accumulation of imputed
interest on the Government investment-neither of which show up as
obligations in the appropriate system.
Civiak, supra note 243, at 8, 9.
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bank or mortgage company which requires payment of annual
interest as well as a portion of the balance due with respect to
a customary home mortgage.
A much broader set of questions, however, faces Congress.
These include: whether to allow a write-off of some of the $7.5
billion in unrecovered costs and, if so, how much; whether to
require DOE to recover future costs; how to provide effective
oversight and guidance for the agency; and how to prevent DOE
from again falling into a position like its current one.
Aside from the possible suspension of DOE's revised criteria,
the only consideration to date which Congress has afforded these
issues is in the context of Senator Domenici's proposed "Uranium Revitalization and Tailing Reclamation Act of 1982.'P251
This bill, in its last extant version, would have legislatively
approved DOE's new enrichment contract and would have
adopted it as DOE's new criteria. The bill would also have
amended Section 161v. to make cost recovery a secondary priority in favor of maximization of agency market share. In addition,
the proposal would have established a cost allocation formula
under which utilities and uranium mill operators would have
shared the expenses of reclaiming existing uranium mill tailings.
The proposal further would have required utilities to purchase
approximately 50% of their uranium requirements domestically.
The bill largely endorsed DOE's current policies, except insofar as
it would have shifted about $3.4 billion from the Treasury to domestic uranium producers in the form of tailings and import relief,
and to DOE enrichment customers (both foriegn and domestic) in
the form of reduced enrichment prices. Earlier versions of the
proposed legislation have been opposed by the Administration as
well as by the utility industry, chiefly because of the de facto
transfer of funds to domestic uranium producers in the form of
tailings and import relief. 5 ' In addition to the controversy on tailings and import relief,2" the proposed legislation poses a number of
potentially more weighty concerns. For example, despite resolving
the question of discretion to take write-offs and pursue market
" S 1004, 99th Cong., IstSess. (1986).
2'2
See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy Research & Dev. of the Senate
Energy and Natural Resources Comm., 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986) (statement for the
Record submitted by Edison Electric Institute).
...The bill was the subject of negative editorials principally on grounds of import
relief in the Washington Post. Washington Post, Oct. 16, 1986, at A20.
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share goals at the expense of cost recovery in favor of DOE, the bill
does nothing to address GAO's concerns about the need to provide
effective guidelines for purposes of oversight of DOE's management of the program. Although the bill was reported by the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, it failed to
reach the Senate floor prior to adjournment of Congress. 214
IV.

SOME POLICY OPTIONS

Before one can analyze the merits of the statutory revisions,
one must develop some sense of what purpose DOE's enrichment
program is intended to serve. 2 " This question is very complex
and can be approached from a number of directions. The simplest approach is by analysis of the three basic enrichment pricing options available to DOE. These three options are: (1) to
price above cost (i.e., for profit); (2) to price below cost (i.e.,
to subsidize); and (3) to price at cost. DOE is currently barred
by law from pricing above25 6 or below 2 5 7 its costs. However, one
may still ask what policies would be served thereby, and whether
either option might reasonably be expected to be realistically
maintainable.
Pricing for a profit would foster a number of potential
objectives. For example, it could raise revenues for a government
deeply in deficit. It could encourage the development of alternative sources of supply, which might further the professed
objective of "privatization." But pricing at a profit would be
difficult to reconcile with a number of other important interests.
For example, profit-taking may tend to encourage the development of foreign sources of supply. This might be viewed as
contrary to United States' nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
In addition, if the costs of enrichment are set so high as to
significantly increase the cost of nuclear power, the approach
21 According to the Washington Post, the Administration threatened to veto the
Continuing Resolution if the Appropriations Committees attempted to "write-off" additional enrichment debt. See Washington Post, Oct. 15, 1986, at 417, col. 5. This threat
would presumably also extend to the "Uranium Revitalization and Tailings Reclamation
Act."
21 Congressmen Udall and Seiberling wrote GAO on July 30, 1985, requesting an
-assessment of the costs and benefits to the United States of various uranium enrichment
objectives." Letter from Congressmen Udall and Seiberling to Mr. Charles Bowsher
(July 30, 1985). Such an assessment is long overdue.
21 42 U.S.C. § 2201v (1982).
21142 U.S.C. §§ 2201v & 2209 (1982).
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arguably would be inconsistent with the basic Atomic Energy
Act purpose of encouraging the development of that form of
energy.25 8 Where one comes out on this balancing of interests
may be of only theoretical value: DOE takes the position that

it cannot even recover its capital investment in the federal enrichment enterprise due to foreign competition. This implies that
there is no possibility of extracting a profit at least in the near
term.
Pricing below cost might also foster a number of potential

objectives: it could perhaps (1) increase U.S. enrichment export
sales and thus reduce the balance of trade deficit; (2) enhance
employment in the enrichment industry; (3) encourage the development of civilian nuclear power by lowering nuclear fuel prices;
(4) foster U.S. energy independence by encouraging domestic
utilities to shun foreign supplies; and (5) assist in discouraging
the development of foreign uranium enrichment facilities and
thus serve nuclear non-proliferation objectives.
Subsidization, however, has a number of drawbacks. First,

the subsidy must come from someone. Subsidization means either
raising taxes, sustaining a higher deficit (i.e., borrowing), or
transferring funds from some existing program to partially support the enrichment program's costs. It is not clear whether the
interests stated in favor of subsidization would be sufficient to
warrant any of these steps for this particular industry. 5 9 Second,
42 U.S.C. § 2013(d) (1982).
-" The various justifications offered for subsidizing the U.S. enrichment enterprise,
including assistance with respect to the U.S. balance of payments; provision of employment, and energy independence, are not compelling. First, the trade in enrichment
services is relatively small. Even if all civilian U.S. enrichment requirements were satisfied
abroad, there would be only a negligible impact on our overall trade deficit. See
Statement of Keith Fultz, supra note 204, at 8. Second, if the United States is not
competitive, and we wish to reduce any trade deficit in the area of enrichment, then the
Government must either subsidize our enrichment enterprise or impose quotas or tariffs
to impede entry of foreign enrichment services. But unless relief is invoked pursuant to
existing trade remedies (the applicability of which remain to be demonstrated), such measures
would likely be viewed as interference with free trade in contravention of U.S. trade policies
and GATT obligations. In any event, subsidies or quotas might lead to demands for compensation under GATT, and, if compensation were denied or deemed inadequate, to costly foreign retaliation against other U.S. products. The argument concerning employment is similar to that relating to balance of trade. It implies support either for a subsidy
or a barrier to imports, both of which present trade potential policy problems. The
argument relating to energy independence is also weak. Energy independence is certainly
a frequently evoked benefit said to be associated with reliance on nuclear power. But
it is particularly difficult to invoke energy independence in the area of nuclear fuel
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the subsidy would presumably run to foreign utilities as well as
domestic utilities. It would be ironic indeed for U.S. taxpayers
years. It is particularly difficult to invoke energy independence in the area of nuclear
when the domestic uranium industry complains that the Government has taken pains
to avoid effective measures to check growing American dependence on foreigh sources
of supply for uranium. See Yokell & DeSalvo, The Uranium Default: Westinghouse
and the Utilities, PUB. UTiu. FORT., Feb. 7, 1985, 20, 24 (most U.S. needs will be
supplied from non-U.S. sources). See generally Review of the Statutes of the U.S.
Domestic Uranium Mining and Milling Industry, Hearing Before the Energy Res. &
Dev. Subcomm. of the Senate Energy and Nat. Res. Comm., 98 Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
Moreover, the existence of national policy favoring energy independence in the nuclear
fuel area is clouded by the existence of moratorium imposed by a number of states on
uranium development. See Rosenberg, Uranium Mining and Milling in Virginia: An
Analysis of Regulatory Choice, 4 VA. J. NAT. REs. L. 81, 123-125 (1984) (New York,
New Jersey, Vermont, and Virginia currently employ such restrictions).
The interest in enhancing U.S. ability to attain non-proliferation objectives is a
more appealing concern with respect to DOE pricing policy. The basic U.S. nonproliferation objective is to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons. See Scheinman, An
Evaluation of Non-Proliferation Policies: Retrospect and Prospect, 4 N.Y. L. SCH. J.
INT'L & Comp. L. 335 (1983). From one perspective, this policy "Looks like the most
frustrating effort since the tidal policies of King Canute." Nye, Maintaining a Nonproliferation Regime, 35 INT'L ORG. 15 (1981). The policy might be more modestly
defined as reducing the rate or degree of proliferation in order to cope with destabilizing
effects. Id. There are limits on the ability of U.S. enrichment policy to support nonproliferation policy, because, among other things, the decision of a foreign government
to proliferate "is, of course, eminently political." Id. at 362-63. However, the ease of
the decision to proliferate is in part a function of the availability of technology, facilities
and material. Id. at 363. If the United States is a reliable supplier of enrichment, there
is less reason for other nations to develop their own enrichment facilities and the decision
to proliferate is thus arguably more difficult for them. Moreover, assurance of enrichment services from the United States can be used as an inducement to encourage other
nations to cooperate in non-proliferation efforts. Stoiber, Current United States Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Policy, 4 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 337, 371 (1983); see also
Nye, supra, at 30-31 (suggests international fuel bank); 1983-84 Hearings, supra note
145, at 140 (statement by Mr. Civiak of CRS). The notion that the United States should
be a reliable supplier of enrichment is codified in section 2(b) of the Non-Proliferation
Act, 22 U.S.C. § 3201(b) (1982), which provides that the United States shall "take such
actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States in meeting its
commitments to supply nuclear ... fuel to nations which adhere to effective non" But these observations do not lead to any specific conclusion
proliferation policies ..
concerning the desirability of subsidizing enrichment services. Section 161v. of the
Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(v) (1982), bars DOE sales of enrichment services
to foreign entities at prices less than those charged domestics and specifically requires
full cost recovery for all sales. It thus forbids subsidization, particularly of foreign
buyers of enrichment. This suggests that the U.S. non-proliferation policy has never
before extended so far as to support subsidization of enrichment sales abroad in order
to curtail a potential foreign proliferator's access to enrichment facilities. Moreover, as
a practical matter, most foreign countries (e.g., U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Italy,
Spain, Belgium and the Netherlands) with sizeable nuclear electrical generating capacity
have developed, have participated in the development of, or intend to develop their own
enrichment capacity, and DOE enrichment policies will now have little effect in terms
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to subsidize foreign energy supplies at the same time the United
States is facing record trade deficits. In short, it is doubtful that
a subsidy for enrichment would be politically acceptable, at least
if taxpayers understood that a subsidy was occurring.
Pricing at cost is a politically defensible position. As long as
DOE is efficient (and can thus price at market levels), the
program should foster nuclear non-proliferation objectives, assist
with respect to the balance of trade, and provide some employment. Pricing solely to cover costs does not involve subsidization
and is unlikely to generate meaningful politicial opposition, except insofar as it denies opportunities for private profit. While
it is true that cost-based pricing may conflict with "privatization" objectives, this undesirable aspect could conceivably be
mitigated by appropriate commitments to make the next round
of technology available for exploitation by private suppliers.
Even if pricing at cost appears reasonable, one must inquire
whether it is sustainable in the current market environment.
More precisely, the U.S. economy is presumptively based on a
free market ideology in which only the economically efficient
survive. Since DOE is purportedly the world's highest cost enof deterring these activities. The principal impact of DOE enrichment policies will be
on countries whose nuclear electrical generating capacity is relatively small and whose
principal interest in developing enrichment capacity would be to export enriched uranium
(presumably for a profit) or to support a nuclear weapons program. DOE pricing policies
are likely to have minimal influence on a potential proliferator developing enrichment
capacity for weapons purposes, because that country's primary motivation is nationalistic
or ideological, not economic. DOE pricing policies, however, might influence a country
seeking to justify enrichment capacity on the basis of projected export earnings. Put
another way, if DOE's prices become significantly higher than those expected to be
incurred by a potential proliferator, the potential proliferator may find it commercially
attractive to build its own facility. In short, the strongest statement one can make in favor
of below cost pricing, non-proliferation goals might arguably be marginally better served,
at least from time to time, by allowing DOE to subsidize sales to foreign concerns.
Whether a subsidy in fact would be effective at all in deterring construction of
additional enrichment facilities is a complex question which is probably impossible to
answer with any certainty as a general matter. Suffice it to say here that it is not clear
that a sufficient domestic political consensus could be assembled to make a commitment
to provide subsidies which would appear believable to a foreign government, especially
over a significant period of time and especially in view of the fact that the United States
would be subsidizing a basic input into foreign products against which it frequently
has competitive difficulties. To further complicate the issue the capital cost of enrichment facilities is expected to decline sharply with the advent of AVLIS technology.
If this technology spreads. cost-competitive enrichment facilities may soon be in reach
of many more governments, and the utility of DOE's enrichment enterprise in achieving
nuclear non-proliferation objectives may thus be further weakened.
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richer, "60 this raises the question whether the DOE enrichment
enterprise is sufficiently cmpetitive to remain in the commercial
market, even if it prices only at cost. In the phraseology of international economics, perhaps the United States (or at least the DOE)
does not enjoy a comparative advantage in uranium enrichment and
should therefore "get out."
Some justification for a continued U.S. presence in the nuclear fuel market on grounds of economic efficiency exists, but
it is a justification based on the future rather than the current
time. Although the United States enrichment enterprise as recently conducted does not appear to be competitive,"' the same
cannot be said for the new AVLIS technology being developed
by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. Lawrence Livermore suggests
that a one million SWU enrichment facility relying on laser isotopic
separation could be in operation by the early 1990's and could
' 2 6 1 If
provide enrichment at a "probable cost of $25 per SWU.
the optimism is borne out, the United States may well be highly
competitive in approximately ten years if AVLIS is deployed,
notwithstanding DOE's current non-competitive position.
The strongest grounds on which to espouse diverging from
full cost recovery would be that any effort to recover all costs
would cost taxpayers more than alternatives. Posing the issue in
this fashion raises some very specific questions about DOE's
current approach to managing its program. DOE's current program goals are in essence to reduce the agency's costs as much
as possible and to cut the agency's price as much as possible
263 But as
with an evident intent of maximizing market share.
2' Business Panel, supra note 2. at 14.
1' The U.S. GD program appears to be competitive but for the excess baggage
of what in retrospect were unnecessary capital investments and long-term take-or-pay
electricity contracts with TVA. DOE's "variable cost" for additional SWU's from its
GD plants is within range of the estimated probable cost of AVLIS SWU's.
2-2 Hearing Before the Energy and Environment Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1985) (statement by John L.
Emmett). DOE's Process Evaluation Board (PEB) estimated AVLIS cost at $52-$60
using "multi-variate sensitivity analysis." DOE, Uranium Enrichment Technology Evaluation and Assessment, Executive Summary 1-9 (May 15, 1985).
"' See Business Panel, supra note 2, at 82, 83 (testimony of T. Robert Wolcott,
Chairman of Nuexco). For example, DOE in April 1985 offered an "incentive price of
$90 per SWU to customers with uncommitted sales in FY 1987 through FY 1990." This
"incentive pricing offer proved very successful . . . nearly 87 percent of [DOE's] cus" Hearing Before Energy & Env.
tomers with uncommitted requirements accepted ..
Subcomm.. House Int. & Ins. Affairs Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess 5 (1985) (testimony
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GAO has noted, this program is dependent on write-offs of
DOE plant investments and will not result in the full cost recovery intended by the statute in the near term. Whether costs may
be recovered in the future may hinge on the commercial availability
of AVLIS. However, even if AVLIS is deployed in the next decade,
an opportunity to recover costs may not arise if competition from
foreigh laser isotopic facilities forces down prices. In short, DOE's
current emphasis on maximizing market share may be inconsistent with full cost recovery not only in the short term but in the
long term as well.
An alternative and arguF.bly more reasonable approach for
the agency would be to emphasize maximization of enrichment
revenues. DOE admits that it is not doing this for the next five
years 64 and it is reportedly not the agency's policy for the 1990's
either. "6' Maximization of revenues does not mean price gouging.
It does mean trying to cover not only variable costs (such as
labor and electricity) but also as many fixed costs (depreciation
and imputed interest) as possible. While it may not be possible
to recover all fixed costs using this approach, the unrecovered
investment remaining at the time AVLIS becomes available will
be minimized. Put another way, the net subsidy by U.S. taxpayers to the enrichment program will be minimized. Although it
may lose some business using this approach, the agency will
minimize its losses and in this sense be "competitive." Additionally, the agency will be better able to "privatize" the program.
Whether DOE would lose more than it would gain in pricing
to recover more of its costs depends on the elasticity of demand
for enrichment services. This in turn depends on a number of
factors. These include the loyalty of DOE's customers to the
of John R. Longenecker (DOE)), Doe has subsequently offered an $85 per SWU incentive
price.
'. Hearing Before the Energy and Env. Subcomm. of the House Interior and
Insular Affair Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (prehearing Question and Answers
Propounded by Chairman Udall to DOE; DOE Answer to Udall Question 10: "revenues
would be $330 million higher over the 1986 to 1990 period by maintaining our existing
[$135/SWU] selling price [as opposed to the new $125/SWU price]").
211DOE apparently is offering "incentive prices" of $85/SWU escalated by the
impact price deflator for the U.S. gross national product for 1991-95. Moreover, DOE
has produced some price projections indicating that the base price under the utility
services contract may be close to sioo/SWU around 1991. See NucLEAR FUEL 3 (Dec.
16, 1985).

JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY

[VOL. 2:1

agency; 2 the differential between foreign and domestic SWU
prices; the availability of excess capacity abroad; the likelihood

of timely construction of additional foreign capacity; and the
amount of uncommitted demand which could fill such excess
capacity as currently exists outside the United States. These latter
points merit scrutiny. According to Congressional Budget Office
' there are
estimates, which generally conform to DOE figures, 67
currently about 5 to 6 million SWUs per year of excess capacity
inEurope.2 6s This amount is expected to erode to only about 2

to 3 millin SWU's by 1990.69 Similarly, there are approximately
6 million SWU's of demand projected for the 1990's that are uncommitted.27 0 If this is correct, the uncommitted demand would
readily balance out foreign excess capacity available in the 1990'sthe time period in which DOE fears the loss of significant business.
Under these circumstances, DOE could now price to recover more

of its costs and would not lose significant business, even if priced at
levels which approached full-cost recovery, unless foreign interests
could rapidly construct additional capacity. A major expansion of
existing foreign GD or gas centrifuge capacity seems unlikely,
however, in face of DOE's projected lower-cost AVLIS technology. 271 In short, DOE possesses a degree of market power,
at least on the margin. Put another way, it would appear under
the stated facts that business would be forced to patronize DOE
even if DOE priced its enrichment services at levels higher than
EURODIF or URENCO. This suggests that DOE may be able
2- See Business Panel, supra note 2, at 84 (Nuexco Chairman questions whether
U.S. utilities would "seriously hurt" - desert - DOE); 1983-84 Hearings, supra note
145, at 72 (Nuexco questions whether demand for uranium enrichment is responsive to
price). But see id. at 313, 314 (George Rifakes of Commonwealth Edison asserts that
domestic utilities have gone to non-DOE sources for short-term price benefits even
though there are "potential . . . long-term costs" in doing so.).
-" See Business Panel, supra note 2, at 5 1-52.
26
CBO, supra note 2, at 2.
"- Compare id. at 15 (Eurodif and Urenco capacity static) with id. at 17 (Eurodif
demand at 8 million SWU).
-11,Id. at 14.
21, DOE claims that it must cut its prices in order to "bring in an additional $7
billion in revenues," evidently from 1991 through the year 2000, because its customers
"will begin to leave DOE in 1991 and will totally leave DOE by the year 2000" if the
agency maintains prices "at FY 1985 levels (i.e., $135/SWUI". See Hearings Before the
Energy and Env. Subcomm. of the House Interior and Insular Affairs Comm., 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (DOE Answer to Udall Question 10). DOE's analysis, however,
seems to assume a worst case, does not address the question of where DOE's customers
will go in the 1990's, and appears to overlook the factors indicated in the test. See also
Bujon, supra note 10, at 9.
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to recover all, or at least more of, its costs than it currently
anticipates. Clearly the question of elasticity of demand for
DOE's enrichment product -especially in the 1990's- and the
continued desirability of full cost recovery are key issues for
Congressional policy-makers to explore.
If DOE in fact cannot recover the taxpayer's seven billion
dollar plus investment in the federal enrichment enterprise, Congress is faced with some potentially troublesome decisions. Either it
will have to accede to what in effect is a multi-billion dollar
subsidy to domestic and foreign nuclear utilities, or it will have
to come up with alternative means to raise the money. Neither
result is a happy one. Utilities and their ratepayers will argue
that they should not be burdened with costs attributable to a
misconceived and overly corpulent government enrichment program. Taxpayers can argue that they should not bear the costs
of a program to benefit the utilities when a basic ground rule
of the program has always been that the utilities would bear the
costs and especially when the utility industry actually encouraged
the investment in enrichment facilities for which a write-off is now
sought.
Assuming Congress wishes to place at least a substantial
portion of the $7.5 billion dollar cost on the beneficiaries of the
enrichment program, and assuming that DOE cannot do so
through its current SWU prices, there are basically two alternatives. First, U.S. utilities might be required to procure a
substantial portion of their needs from DOE (i.e., an import
restriction) so that DOE could recover its costs without loss of
business.2 72 However, it may be difficult to square such an
import limitation with the United States' obligation not to impose new barriers to international trade under GATT. Moreover,
this approach would have to be carefully tailored to maintain
or create new incentives for DOE to act more efficiently. Second,
the billions needed could be raised by a kind of excise tax on
nuclear generated electricity. The fee per kilowatt-hour approach
2'2 DOE arguably has authority under sections 161(b) & (p) of the Atomic Energy
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) & (p) (1982), to implement any of the purposes of the Act.
To the extent that enrichment cost recovery is a purpose of the Act, DOE would
arguably have power to compel its domestic customers to procure DOE enrichment
services to this end. Cf. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States, 598 F.2d 759, 769,
776-77 (3d Cir. 1979) (NRC has broad authority under section 161(p) of the Atomic
Energy Act to implement various Atomic Energy Act objectives outside the "health and
safety" area).
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employed by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act for financing the
disposal of spent nuclear fuel offers a possible model.273 Such
an approach would be acceptable under GATT. Moreover, since
it in no way limits importation of enriched uranium, it would
maintain all existing competitive pressures on the federal enrichment enterprise to remain efficient. However, there are negative
features to this approach, for it would visit upon domestic
utilities the costs of what in retrospect were mistaken investments. These investments were made not only for the benefit of
domestic utilities, but for the benefit of foreign utilities as well.
Moreover, to the extent it was, as the DOE now states, "the
wrong thing for the country ... [a] government mistake we
may question whether the utilities
should not have made," one
2 74
burden.
the
all
bear
should
Over and above the question of costs, there is the question
of accountability: how the enrichment program should be structured so that its overseers know what DOE is doing and that
DOE does what it is supposed to do. To a large extent, the
criteria requirement of Section 161v. was to assist Congress in
achieving this purpose. It is increasingly clear that the criteria
are not a workable mechanism to attain this objective absent the
oversight of the powerful Joint Committee. Some alternative
means of effective oversight and guidance must be provided.
Perhaps the answer lies outside Congress in the form of various
proposals to "privatize" the enrichment business, or at least to
establish some kind of separate entity to run the program.2 7
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 10222(a)(2) (1982) (1 mil/kwh to generate the estimated $20
billion required for disposal facilities designed, constructed and managed by the federal
government).
" See U.S. Uranium Enrichment Program Said Mismanaged, Wash. Post, March
Ii, 1986, at D4, col. I (statement of DOE Dep. Assis. Sec. Longenecker). As noted, however, the National Taxpayers Union (NTU) has pointed out that representatives of the nuclear
utility industry actively supported and even solicited the "mistake" in question.
." The idea of an "independent entity . . . removed from regular government
functions" and organized as a business enterprise is hardly a new solution to the problem
of managing DOE's enrichment program. See Hosmer, The Future of Uranium Enrichment, Pun. UTnL. FORT., March 26, 1981, 13, 17; see also Business Panel, supra note
2, at XVI-XVII. Legislation to establish a public/private "United States Enrichment
Corporation" was discussed in 1971-74. Legislation to establish a wholly private enrichment corporation was considered in 1975-78. Hosmer, supra, at 14. These proposals
foundered in the face of the federal government's overcapacity and the apparent perception (a) that the existing government program was efficient and could provide enrichment services more cheaply than alternative suppliers, (b) that additional competition
was unnecessary to encourage lower prices, and (c) that the uranium fuel cycle was soon
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The real questions relating to DOE's enrichment policies and
problems are only beginning to be asked. It remains to be seen
how (or even if) the questions will be resolved. And equally
important, it remains to be seen whether, and how, a viable
program will emerge for the future.

going to be obsolete (i.e., that enrichment would not be important because of future
reliance on breeder reactors and the plutonium fuel cycle). See id. at 17. Mr. Hosmer,
a former ranking Member of the Joint Committee and the first President of the American
Nuclear Energy Council, also notes additional problems in reorganizing the federal
enrichment enterprise. These include vested interests, the general economic distress of
the utility industry, antitrust considerations (Mr. Hostner argues that enrichment is a
public utility-like function), and "OMBsmanship" (Mr. Hosmer suggests that OMB uses
the enrichment program "to produce fiscal illusions" in the DOE budget and thus is
not truly inclined to support either privatization or some kind of hybrid public/private
organization). Id.
Given the spotty track record of enrichment program management throughout the
existing management structure, it certainly seems time for Congress to revisit the question
of how the Federal enrichment enterprise might better be organized. The principal limit
on the available set of organization structures may arise from the goal that the United
States be perceived as a reliable supplier of enrichment services (see 22 U.S.C. § 2301(b)
(1982)) in order to support U.S. non-proliferation policy. However, one can imagine
many structures for the enrichment program compatible with this constraint.
DOE has taken some initial steps in the direction of "privatization." The agency
recently advertised in the Federal Register for expressions of interest in aspects of its
enrichment enterprise. 51 Fed. Reg. 11811 (1986). DOE received 16 responses (Letter,
Mr. Longenecker to Mr. Repici, July 24, 1986), but none amounted to an actual proposal
to acquire all or substantially all of DOE's commercial program. The most concrete proposal envisioning a transfer of some of the assets called for a private takeover of portions
of the agency's GCEP assets at a fraction of the government costs, with the new GCEP
operator contracting to supply enrichment to DOE to furnish to its utility customers. See
INSIDE ENERGaY (McGH) at 69 (June 2, 1986). Such proposals are likely to stir political controversy from several directions. First, some state delegations will be concerned about
impact on existing DOE GD plants in their jurisdiction. Second, questions may be raised
about the propriety of transferring government assets at a fraction of value to private
hands for sale of enrichment services back to the government at a private profit. Third,
some doubt has been raised concerning whether enrichment facilities can be sold without
congressional approval in the first place. See Robert Poling (Cong. Res. Service), Legal
Authority to Sell U.S. Uranium Enrichment Facilities without Further Legislation, reprinted in NUCLEAR FUEL (McGH) 12-18 (June 2, 1986). DOE deemed the proposal in
question inadequate. See DOE Press Release (July 19, 1986). Several responses suggested
that the agency explore a transition to private ownership through a government corporation. See Letter from Mr. Longenecker to Mr. Repici (July 24, 1986) (attachment, Martin
Marietta, Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Stone & Webster, Bechtel); see also Atomic Industrial
Forum Comm. on Fuel Cycle Policy, Statement on Privitization of the U.S. Enrichment
Business (Nov. 1986).

